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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was originally brought by plaintiff James
Sanchez ("plaintiff") against defendants Little America Hotel
Corporation ("Little America"), Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA
Architect & Associates, Okland Construction Company ("Okland
Construction"), Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-Hilton
Plumbing & Heating Company.
pp. 51-83).

(Second Amended Complaint, Record at

Plaintiff's action against defendants sounds in

negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and strict
liability, to recover damages for injuries he sustained from
diving into a swimming pool at Little America Hotel on July 5,
1986.

(Id.)
Little America Hotel filed a cross-claim against

defendants Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect & Associates, and
Okland Construction seeking express and implied indemnity.
(Cross-claim Against Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect &
Associates and Okland Construction Company, Record at 125-28 and
attached hereto in Addendum at pp. A6-10).

The cross-claim for

express indemnity was based upon the fact that Little America
entered into a contract with Okland Construction and as part of
the contract, Okland Construction agreed to indemnify and hold
Little America harmless from and against all claims, damages,
losses and expenses, including attorneys' fees growing out of
their agreement to construct the swimming pool and sauna at Little
America Hotel.

(Id.) The claim for equitable indemnity was based

on the fact that the conduct of Little America Hotel was passive

and secondary in nature compared to the active and primary nature
of the acts and omissions of the cross-claim defendants.

(Id.)

Defendants Martin Stern, Jr. & Associates, Okland
Construction, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-HiLton
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. moved for summary judgment based upon
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 (1967), "the Construction Statute of
Repose."

The district court granted the motion for summary

judgment as to claims made by the plaintiff on the basis that
plaintifffs complaint was time-barred under Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-25.5.

(Order granting Summary Judgment of Defendants

Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect & Associates, Rocky Mountain
Pools, Inc., Higham-Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and Ok Land
Construction Company, Record at pp. 366-68).
Defendant Okland Construction subsequently moved for
summary judgment as to the cross-claims of Little America.
(Record at pp. 344-46).

The district court granted the motion on

the grounds that Utah Code Ann. §7 8-12-25.5 was a bar to Little
America's cross-claims against Okland Construction.

(Transcript

of Hearing on Defendant Okland Construction's Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Cross-Claim of Little America, Record at 512 and
attached hereto in Addendum at pp. Al-2 3; Order Granting Summary
Judgment in Favor of Okland Construction Company as to
Cross-Claims of Little America, Record at 443-45 and attached
hereto in Addendum at pp. A24-27).

The judgment was certified as

a final judgment.
Defendant Little America-appellant filed a timely notice

of appeal and requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
decision denying Little America's right of indemnification against
Okland Construction on its claim for indemnity.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Does Little America retain the right to seek

indemnity from Okland Construction even if the plaintiff's action
against Okland Construction is barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5?
2.

Does the seven-year Construction Statute of Repose,

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, violate the Utah and United States
Constitution?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The determinative Utah statutory provisions are:
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25.5 (1967) — Injury Due
to Defective Design or Construction of Improvement to
Real Property -- Within Seven Years; and
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-23 (1953) — Within Six
Years -- Mesne Profits of Real Property — Instrument
in Writing — Distribution of Criminal Proceeds to
Victim.
The determinative Utah constitutional provisions are:
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §2 [All political power
inherent in the people.];
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §7 [Due process of law.];
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §11 [Courts open--redress
of injury.];
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §24 [Uniform operation of
laws,].
The determinative United States Constitutional provision
is:
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1.

(All determinative authorities are set out in verbatim in the
Addendum at pp. A2-5).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
THE CLAIM
On or about September 11, 1975, Little America, the
owner, and Okland Construction, the contractor, entered into and
signed a standard form of agreement between owner and contractor.
(Record at pp. 3 89-408 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp.
A28-48).

Okland Construction was to perform all the work required

by the contract documents for Little America.

(Id. ) Under said

contract Okland Construction was responsible for building the
hotel, including the swimming pool and sauna.

Among other things,

the contract defined work in paragraph 1.13 as:
The term Work includes all labor necessary
to produce the construction required by the
Contract Documents, and all materials and
equipment incorporated or to be incorporated
in such construction. (Addendum at p. A-35).
Under said contract, Okland Construction was responsible
for building the hotel, including the swimming pool and sauna.

As

part of the contractual documents, specifications set out in
detail requirements for construction with respect to the swimming
pool and sauna that were to be constructed by Okland Construction.
(Record at pp. 410-418 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp.
A49-58).
Okland Construction was contractually responsible for
those performing the work.

Paragraph 4.10.1 of the agreement

between the parties provides:

The Contractor shall be responsible to the
Owner for the acts and omissions of all his
employees and all Subcontractors, their
agents and employees, and all other persons
performing any of the Work under a contract
with the Contractor.
Okland Construction agreed to indemnify Little America
under the terms of the contract between Okland and Little America.
(Record at pp. 389-408 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp.
28-48).

Paragraph 4.18.1 of that agreement contains the following

indemnity provision:
The contractor shall indemnify and hold
harmless the owner and the architect and
their agents and employees from and against
all claims, damages, losses and expenses
including attorney's fees arising out of or
resulting from the performance of the work,
provided that any such claim, damage, loss
or expense (1) is attributable to bodily
injury, sickness, disease or death, or to
injury to or destruction of tangible
property (other than the work itself)
including the Loss of use resulting
therefrom, and (2) is caused in whole or in
part by any negligent act or omission of the
Contractor, any Sub-constractor, anyone
directly or indirectly employed by any of
them or anyone for whose acts any of them
may be liable, regardless of whether or not
it is caused in part by a party indemnified
hereunder. (Id. at Record at p. 399 and
Addendum at p. 39). (Emphasis added).
Moreover, Okland Construction agreed to purchase and
maintain contractor's liability insurance sufficient to insure
contractual obligations under the indemnity provisions of
paragraph 4.18.1 of the parties' agreement.

Paragraph 11.1.1 of

the agreement provides:
The Contractor shall purchase and maintain
such insurance as will protect him from

claims set forth below which may arise out
of or result from the Contractor's
operations under the Contract, whether such
operations be by himself or by any Subcontractor or by anyone directly or
indirectly employed by any of them, or
anyone for whose acts any of them may be
liable. (Ici. at Record at p. 405 and
Addendum at p. A45).
On or about November 15, 1978, the construction at Little
America was substantially completed.

(Record at pp. 211-12).

On

or about that date Little America took possession of the premises
and began to use the facilities, including the sauna and swimming
pool.
On September 10, 1987, plaintiff James Sanchez filed a
Second Amended Complaint against, among others, defendants Little
America Hotel, Okland Construction, Martin Stern, Jr. &
Associates, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc., and Higham-Hilton
Mechanical Contractors, Inc.
pp. 51-83).

(Second Amended Complaint, Record at

Plaintiff commenced the action against the

aforementioned defendants seeking compensation for injuries
suffered on July 5, 1986, when he dove into a swimming pool at
Little America Hotel.

(Id.)

On February 17, 1988, defendant Little America Hotel,
pursuant to Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, filed
a cross-claim against defendant Okland Construction and defendant
Martin Stern, Jr. seeking contractual and equitable indemnity.
(Record at pp. 125-28 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp.
A6-10).

The cross-claim for contractual indemnity was based upon

the fact that Little America entered into a contract with Okland

Construction and as part of said contract, Okland Construction
agreed to indemnify and hold Little America Hotel harmless from
and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses, including
attorneys' fees growing out of their agreement to construct the
swimming pool and sauna at Little America Hotel.

(Idl. ) The claim

for equitable indemnity was based on the fact that the conduct of
Little America Hotel was passive and secondary in nature, whereas
the conduct of Okland Construction was active and primary in
nature.

(1(3. )
On July 18, 1988 the district court granted summary

judgment in favor of defendants Okland Construction, Martin Stern,
Jr., Rocky Mountain Pools, and Higham-Hilton Mechanical
Contractors with respect to plaintiff's complaint.
366-68).

(Record at pp.

The court granted summary judgment pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. §78-12-25.5 on the grounds that more than seven years had
elapsed from the time that the construction of Little America
Hotel was substantially completed and the date that plaintiff's
action was filed.

(Id.)

On August 4, 1988, defendant Okland Construction filed a
motion for summary judgment as to the cross-claims of Little
America.

(Record at pp. 344-46).

The district court granted

summary judgment on defendant Little America's cross-claim in
favor of defendant Okland Construction.

(Record at pp. 443-45

and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. A24-27).

The court found

that Utah Code Ann. §78-12.25.5 was likewise a bar to Little
America's cross-claims against Okland Construction.

(Id.;

Transcript of Hearing on Defendant Okland Construction's Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Cross-Claim of Little America, Record
at p. 512 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. All-23).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Little America retains the right to seek indemnity from
Okland Construction even if plaintiff's action against Okland
Construction is barred by the Construction Statute of Repose.
Little America's claim for indemnity is not governed by Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25.5 c Little America's cross-claim for indemnity is
separate and distinct from and is not governed by the statute of
limitations applicable to plaintiff's underlying action.

Little

America's claim for contractual indemnity is governed by Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-23, the six-year statute of limitations applicable to
contract actions.

Also, under general principles, Little

America's claim for indemnity is not barred.

Based upon the

foregoing, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 does not govern Little
America's cross-claim against Okland Construction for indemnity.
Assuming arguendo, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is
applicable to Little America's cross-claim for indemnity, the
Construction Statute of Repose is unconstitutional.

Utah Code

Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates the constitutional guarantee of Little
America's right of access to the courts.

Utah Code Ann.

§78-12-25.5 is a class legislation and violates equal protection
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 also violates due process.

The

Construction Statute of Repose, on its face, prohibits Little
America from bringing its action for indemnity because plaintiff's

underlying action is barred by the statutory seven-year period
notwithstanding that defendant's indemnity action did not accrue
upon completion of the premises in question.

This absolute bar is

arbitrary and discriminatory and violates the Utah and United
States Constitution,
ARGUMENT
POINT I,
LITTLE AMERICA'S CROSS-CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY
AGAINST OKLAND CONSTRUCTION IS NOT GOVERNED
BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5.
Little America's cross-claim against Okland Construction
is not barred by the Construction Statute of Repose, Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25.5 (1967).

Little America's claim for indemnity is

separate and distinct from and is not governed by the statute of
limitations applicable to plaintiff's underlying action.
Moreover, Little America's claim for indemnity, based upon an
express contract with Okland Construction, is governed by Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-23 (1953), the six-year statute of limitations
applicable to actions on written contracts.

Finally, under

general principles, Little America's claim for equitable indemnity
does not accrue and the limitations period does not begin to run
until the litigation against it has ended or liability, if any,
has been discharged.

A*

Little America's Cross-Claim for Indemnity is
Separate and Distinct From and is not Governed by
the Statute of Limitations Applicable to Plaintiff's
Underlying Action.

This Court recognized in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale
Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984), that "the statute of
limitations on an indemnity action does not begin to run until the
cause of action accrues, even though the statute of limitations on
the underlying action may already have run."

At issue in Perry

was whether a purchaser of goods could obtain indemnity from a
manufacturer-supplier for damages that the purchaser was forced to
pay by reason of an alleged breach of warranty even though the
purchaser did not file its indemnification action until after the
statute of limitations had run on the underlying cause of action.
Id. at 217.

In denying the claim for indemnity, this Court relied

upon an absolute limitation period specified in the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code which conflicted with the general limitations rule
for indemnity actions.
This Court has not specifically addressed whether one
tort-feasor can recover indemnity from a second tort-feasor in a
third-party action if the plaintiff's direct right of action
against the latter is barred by a statute of limitations.

This

Court has, however, addressed a similar issue as to whether an
action involving a claim for contribution was barred because the
underlying claim was filed after the applicable statute of
limitations in Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689
P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984).
In Unigard, an insurer which had settled a lawsuit

arising out of an automobile collision in the City of LaVerkin
(the "City"), sued the City for contributory negligence as a joint
tort-feasor, based on the City's failure to keep a "yield" sign
free from obstruction by foliage.

The City claimed that the

action was barred because the insurer did not give the City notice
within one year as required by the Governmental Immunity Act.
This Court held that the one-year provision of the Governmental
Immunity Act was inapplicable to the claim for contribution.
This Court found that a claim for contribution arises
only when the defendant meets the conditions specified by the
Comparative Negligence Act and therefore the one-year claim period
was inapplicable.

This Court stated:

If the City's view prevailed that the action
arose with the occurrence of the tort
action, a plaintiff could destroy a joint
tort-feasor's right of contribution by not
bringing his action until after the statute
of limitations had run on the defendant's
action, (citations omitted) That result would
be both inherently unfair as well as in
conflict with the basic policy of the
Comparative Negligence Act. . . . Id. at
1346.
Although Unigard involved an action for contribution,
this Court's reasoning provides guidance with regard to Little
America's cross-claim for indemnity against Okland Construction in
the present action.

Claims for indemnity and contribution are

both derivative in nature.

In other words, a cause of action for

indemnity or contribution does not arise until an adverse judgment
has been rendered or a settlement is made.

A defendant's right to

seek contribution or indemnity is distinct from a plaintiff's

right to recovery.
In analyzing the application of the statute of
limitations on claims for indemnity or contribution, the fact that
the claim is derivative is the key factor in determining the
threshold question of when the cause of action accrues.

Because

of the derivative nature of a claim for indemnity or for
contribution, case law interpreting at what point a cause of
action for contribution accrues is analogous to and arguably stare
decisis as to the determination of when a cause of action for
indemnity accrues.
Based upon the reasoning in Unigard, Little America
retains the right to seek indemnity from Okland Construction even
if plaintiff's action against Okland Construction is barred by
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5.

To find that Little America's claim

for indemnity is barred by the Construction Statute of Repose in
the underlying action would be "inherently unfair" and in conflict
with the basic premise of indemnity.

The applicable statute of

limitation for plaintiff's complaint against defendants has no
bearing on Little America's cross-claim for indemnity against
Okland Construction.
Other jurisdictions have likewise found that a third
party's claim for contribution or indemnity is separate and
distinct from and is not governed by the statute of limitations
applicable to plaintiff's underlying action. See, e.g., Thornton
v. Town of Hull, 515 F.Supp. 715 (D.Mass. 1981); Grimmer v.
Harbor Towers, 183 Cal.Rptr. 634 (Cal.App. 1982); Valley Circle

Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc., 659 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 1983);
Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978);
Castle Construction v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 425 So.2d 573
(Fla.App. 1982); Toar Construction Co. v. GAF Corp., 267 S.E.2d
6 35 (Ga.App. 19 80); State ex rel General Electric Co. v. Gaertner,
666 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. 1984); Winn v. Peter Bratti Associates, Inc.,
364 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. 1975); Methodist Hospital v. Leon D.
DeMatteis Construction, 413 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y.App. 1979);
McDermott v. City of New York, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y.App. 1980);
Huff v. Shiomi, 699 P.2d 1178 (Or.App. 1985); and AMOCO Chemicals
Corp. v. Malone Service Company, 712 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.App. 1986).
The Supreme Court of California examined an issue
identical to the instant action and concluded that a tort
defendant retains the right to seek indemnity from another tortfeasor even if the plaintiff's action against the cross-defendant
was barred by the statute of limitations in Valley Circle Estates
v. VTN Consolidated, Inc., 659 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 1983).

In 1978,

the plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages to their home.

The

defendants included the general contractor, developer and seller
of the residence, Valley Circle Estates ("Valley Circle11).
Valley Circle was a partnership comprised of numerous
entities and individuals who were separately sued in the action,
one of which was VTN Consolidated ("VTN")-

The completion of

VTN's services was certified on April 5, 1966. A notice of Valley
Circle's completion of the residence was signed March 25, 1968,
and recorded March 28, 1968.

Valley Circle filed a cross-complaint for a declaratory
relief to determine its equitable indemnity rights against VTN.
Subsequently VTN filed a motion for summary judgment to compel its
dismissal from the direct action asserting that as to it the
action, filed twelve years after completion of its services, was
untimely under the applicable statute of limitations.

The trial

court granted VTN's motion.
After its dismissal from the direct action VTN filed a
motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal from Valley Circle's
cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, again relying upon the
applicable statute of limitations.

The trial court rendered

summary judgment in favor of VTN.

Valley Circle subsequently

appealed contending that under the common law rule "a cause of
action for indemnity does not accrue until the indemnitee has
suffered a loss through payment of an adverse judgment or
settlement." icL at 116 5.
The California Supreme Court was in agreement with Valley
Circle's argument, in reversing its grant of summary judgment, the
court stated:
[T]he governing authorities, both in
California and throughout the country,
uniformly hold that a tort defendant's
equitable indemnity action is separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's tort action.
The indemnity action, unlike the plaintiff's
claim, does not accrue for statute of
limitation purposes when the original
accident occurs, but instead accrues at the
time the tort defendant pays a judgment or
settlement as to which he is entitled to
indemnity. Id. (citations omitted).

The court further stated that:
A tort defendant retains the right to seek
equitable indemnity from another tort-feasor
even if the plaintiff's action against the
cross-defendant is barred by the statute of
limitations. 1^.
(citations omitted).
Likewise in the present case, Little America's crossclaim for indemnity against Okland Construction is separate and
distinct from plaintiff's underlying action.

Little America's

indemnity action did not accrue upon the completion of the
premises at issue.

Little America retains the right to seek

equitable indemnity from Okland Construction even if plaintiff's
action against Okland is time-barred.

For statute of limitation

purposes, Little America's express indemnity claim accrued by
contract at the time any claim, damages, losses and attorneys'
fees arise out of or result from any action which it is entitled
to be held harmless.

Little America's third-party claim for

indemnity against Okland Construction is not barred because
plaintiff's underlying action was brought more than seven years
after the completion of the structures at issue.
B.

Little America's Claim for Contractual Indemnity is
Governed by Utah Code Ann. $78-12-23, the Six-Year
Statute of Limitations Applicable to Contract
Actions.

Little America's claim for indemnity is predicated upon
an express contract of indemnity.

Okland Construction expressly

agreed to indemnify Little America against all claims in Paragraph
4.18.1 of the standard form of agreement between owner Little
America and contractor Okland Construction.

Paragraph 4.18.1 of

the parties contract is enforceable to require Okland to indemnify

Little America for any liability it may incur as a result of any
negligent act or omission of the contractor.
Little America sought to enforce its contractual right of
indemnification from Okland Construction when it filed a crossclaim against Okland-

Okland Construction denied Little America's

claim for indemnity and argued that the claim was governed and
barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5.

Little America's claim for

indemnity, however, is based upon an express contract and thus the
controlling statute of limitations is that with respect to
contractual claims, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23.

Utah Code Ann.

§78-12-23 (1953) provides, in relevant part:
Within six years:
*

*

*

(2) an action upon any contract,
obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in §78-12-22.
*

*

*

Under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23, a party may bring a cause
of action based upon a breach of contract six years after breach
of the contract.

In the instant action, Little America and Okland

Construction entered into the contract on September 11, 1975.
Plaintiff was injured in 1986 and brought his action against
defendants in 1987.

Little America filed its cross-claim for

contractual indemnity against Okland Construction on January 17,
1988, well within the six-year statute of limitations with respect
to actions on contracts.

Little America's claim for indemnity is

not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code

Ann. §78-12-22.
This Court has not addressed the issue as to what statute
of limitations governs a cause of action for contractual
indemnity.

However, on numerous occasions, this Court has found

that actions based upon contracts are governed by the six-year
limitation period found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2).

See,

Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction, 744 P.2d 1370
(Utah 1987) (Action by university against contractor for
installation of defective pipe was an action founded on contract
and subject to the six-year period of limitations).

See e.g.,

Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d
405 (1935); Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d
494 (1954); Amundson v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n,
13 Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463 (1962); Arnold Machinery Co. v.
Prince, 550 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976); Upland Industries Corp. v.
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638 (Utah 1984); Butcher v.
Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987); Koulis v. Standard Oil, 746
P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987).
Other jurisdictions have addressed the specific issue as
to what statute of limitations governs an express contract of
indemnity and have applied the statute of limitations applicable
to contractual claims.

See, e.g., Richards v. Gold Circle Stores,

501 N.E.2d 670 (Ohio App. 1986): Insurance Company of North
America v. Southeastern Electric Company, Inc., 275 N.W.2d 255
(Mich. 1979); and Thermo King Corporation v. Strick Corporation,
467 F.Supp. 75 (D.C. Pa. 1979).

In Richards v. Gold Circle Stores, supra, the Court of
Appeals of Ohio addressed an issue identical to the instant
action.

The issue addressed on appeal was whether the Ohio ten-

year construction statute of repose was applicable to an express
contract of indemnity.

Defendant and third-party plaintiff, Gold

Circle Stores ("Gold Circle") appealed from a lower court judgment
which found its third-party claim against Six Industries to be
barred by an Ohio construction statute of repose, even though the
third-party claim was predicated upon an express contract of
indemnity.

The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the lower

court's grant of summary judgment against Gold Circle.
In 1982, plaintiff Richards brought its initial action
against Gold Circle and others for personal injuries sustained
from an explosion on Gold Circlefs premises.

Gold Circle filed a

third-party complaint against Six Industries seeking indemnification pursuant to a provision of a construction contract which
provided as follows:
Six Industries shall indemnify and hold
harmless Gold Circle against all claims,
damages, losses and expenses, including
attorney fees, arising out of or resulting
from the performance of the work
attributable to bodily injury caused in
whole or in part by any negligent act or
omission of Six Industries or of its
subcontractors.
Richards, 501 N.E.2d at
672.
Gold Circle contended that its action was predicated upon
breach of the contractual obligation by Six Industries with
respect to plaintiff's claim and thus the controlling statute of
limitations was that with respect to contractual claims.

Six Industries and the trial court took the approach that
GoJd Circle's claim was governed and barred by Ohio's ten-year
construction statute of repose, Ohio Revised Code §2305.131. Ohio
Revised Code §2305.131 provides as follows:
No action to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for bodily
injury or wrongful death, arising out of the
defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, nor any action
for contribution or indemnity for damages
sustained as a result of said injury, shall
be brought against any person performing
services for or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision of construction, or
construction of such improvement to real
property, more than ten years after the
performance or furnishing of such services
and construction. This limitation does not
apply to actions against any person in
actual possession and control as owner,
tenant, or otherwise of the improvement at
the time the defective and unsafe condition
of such improvement constitutes the
proximate cause of the injury or damage for
which the action is brought. Id_. at 671.
(Emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals of Ohio found nothing in R.C.
§2305.131 which indicated an intent to bar claims by the owner of
the improvement for breach of an express written contract for
indemnity which was more than ten years after the construction.
Id. at 673.

In reaching this determination the court relied upon

a prior Ohio Supreme Court decision which found the statute to
apply only to actions which sound in tort not to actions in
contract.

The Ohio Supreme Court explained:
The language selected by the General
Assembly is uniformly used to describe
tortious conduct. For example, the

statute's use of the terms "defective" and
"unsafe" to describe the improvements at
issue distinguish the actions contemplated
within the statute from warranty or other
contractual claims. * * *
* * * Torts arise from the breach of
certain duties of conduct that are imposed
by law for the protection of all persons
within range of the harm or injury
proximately resulting from such breach.
Contractual duties, on the other hand, arise
from the specific agreement of the parties
to the contract.
IcL at 673, citing
Kocisko v. Charles Shutrump & Sons Co., 488
N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 1986) .
Based upon this reasoning the Court of Appeals of Ohio
determined that the legislative intent was to bar only a common
law action for indemnity.

The court, however, found no indication

of a legislative intent "to bar a claim for breach of an express
written contract merely because the contract which was breached
was one for indemnity."

Richards, 501 N.E.2d at 67 3.

The court

stated:
[T]he parties entered into an express
contract of indemnity, which requires Six
Industries to indemnify and hold harmless
Gold Circle, regardless of whether a commonlaw right of indemnity might exist. Since
Gold Circle is attempting to enforce an
express contractual right of indemnity
arising from a written contract, we see no
reason to treat a breach of that contract
any differently from any other breach of the
contract merely because the contractual
right conferred, presumably for a valuable
consideration, is a right of indemnity. Nor
do we find anything in R.C. 2305.131
indicating that it applies to breach of
express written contracts of indemnity.
Although the statute could have expressly
exempted such written contracts of
indemnity, it also could have expressly

included them, if that were the legislative
intent.
To hold otherwise would enable Six
Industries to avoid the contractual
obligation of indemnity, which it undertook
when it executed the contract in question,
by virtue of a statute enacted subsequent to
the execution of the contract. Since,
ordinarily, statutes of limitations may be
waived, it is at least arguable that an
express written contract of indemnity could
provide that it would be applicable
notwithstanding R.C. 2305.131. However, we
find no such exception necessary even if
valid, since we hold that R.C. 2305.131 does
not apply to express written contracts of
indemnity but, instead, has application only
to common law and statutory actions for
contribution or indemnity.
Id.
Based upon the foregoing the court reversed the lower courtfs
grant of summary judgment against Gold Circle.
In the instant action Utahfs Construction Statute of
Repose, found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, likewise does not
apply to the express written contract of indemnity entered into by
Little America and Okland Construction.

The Utah Construction

Statute of Repose is distinguishable from the Ohio statute in that
it does not bar any action for indemnity, equitable or
contractual, which arises out of a defective or unsafe condition
of an improvement to real property. If the Utah Legislature had
intended the statute to bar claims for indemnity they very well
would have included language similar to that in the Ohio statute.
Under the Utah statute all claims for indemnity, contractual or
equitable, may be brought separate and apart from claims governed
by the statute.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 does not govern third-

party claims for indemnity.

The language contained in the Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5
is similar to the Ohio Statute in that the terms solely describe
tortious conduct.

Examples of the key statutory terms in Utah

Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 which refer to tortious conduct are, among
others, "defective and unsafe condition" and "proximate cause of
the injury."

The statute's use of this language is evident of the

legislature's intent to cover only claims which sound in tort.
Thus, Little America's claim based upon an express contract of
indemnity is not governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5.

The

trial court improperly applied Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 to bar
Little America's cross-claim against Okland Construction for
indemnity.
The Michigan Supreme Court decision of Insurance Company
of North America v. Southeastern Electric Co., Inc., 275 N.W.2d
255 (Mich. 1979), also provides guidance to the instant action.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trial court
which denied a contractual claim for indemnity.

The issue

examined by the Michigan Supreme Court was whether a three-year
statute of limitations relating to actions to recover damages for
injuries to persons and property governed the contractual
indemnity claim or whether a six-year statute of limitations
involving actions to recover damages or sums due for breach of
contract governed the action.

The Michigan Supreme Court found

that the six-year limitation period applied.
Factually, in 1971 C & C Construction, the general
contractor of a waste-water treatment plant project, entered into

an agreement with defendant Southeastern Electric ("Southeastern")
as subcontractor.

Southeastern's responsibility as a

subcontractor included the installation of transformers.

The

contract included a clause that Southeastern would "protect and
save harmless" the contractor for any loss or damage to property
occasioned by Southeastern.

.Id. at 255.

On April 5, 197 3, a fire damaged a transformer which
C & C Construction was responsible constituting a loss of
$92,502.94.

Plaintiff insurance company paid C & C Construction

$67,502.94 pursuant to an insurance policy which obligated
plaintiff insurance company to pay for all losses in excess of
$25,000.

Three years and three weeks after the fire, plaintiff

insurance company filed suit against the subcontractor
Southeastern.

The complaint alleged that the fire resulted from

an employee being away from his job in breach of the contract to
install the transformers.
Southeastern moved for accelerated judgment based on the
fact that the three-year statute of limitations had run.

The

trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed the decision of
the trial court contending that the six-year statute of
limitations applied since the suit was founded on an express
contract of indemnity between the subcontractor and the
contractor.
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized that the action
rested on an alleged breach of an express contract of indemnity.
The contractual right to indemnity was established in 1971, the

damage was incurred on April 5, 197 3.

Thus the court found that:

The action is not one "to recover damages
for injuries to persons and property," but,
rather, is one "to recover damages or sums
due for breach of contract" so that the
period of limitations is six years, running
from April 5, 197 3 when the indemnitee
sustained the loss.
Icl. at 256.
The instant action is likewise governed by the Utah sixyear statute of limitations applicable to contract actions, Utah
Code. Ann. §78-12-23.

Little America's third-party complaint

against Okland Construction is founded upon an express contract of
indemnity entered into by the parties in 1975.

Plaintiff's action

against defendants is to recover damages for injuries sustained as
a result of an alleged construction defect.

Plaintiff's actions

are governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25*5, whereas, Little
America's third-party action is governed by Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-23, the six-year statute of limitations.

Little America's

action against Okland Construction is to recover damages or sums
due for breach of the parties' express contract.
The damage which Okland Construction agreed to "protect
and save harmless" occurred on July 5, 1986.

Little America filed

its third-party action for indemnity on January 17, 1988. Clearly
Little America's action based upon the express contract of
indemnity is not barred by the applicable six-year statute of
limitation, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23.

C.

Under General Principles Little America's Claim for
Equitable Indemnity does not Accrue Until Litigation
Against the Third-Party Plaintiff has Ended or
Liability has Been Discharged.

Little America retains the right to seek indemnity from
Okland Construction even if the trial court determined that
plaintiff's action against Okland Construction was barred by the
Construction Statute of Repose, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5.

Under

general principles, Little America's claim for equitable indemnity
does not accrue until litigation against it has ended or
liability, if any, has been discharged. The Utah Supreme Court in
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984),
has recognized that, as a general rule, "a cause of action for
indemnity does not arise until the liability of the party seeking
indemnity results in his damage, either through payment of a sum
clearly owed or through the injured party's obtaining an
enforceable judgment." Idl. at 218.
Other jurisdictions likewise recognize the virtually
universal rule that a claim for indemnity does not begin to accrue
and the limitations period does not begin to run until the
indemnitee's liability is fixed, when it pays the underlying claim
or a judgment on it.

See, e.g., Penn Central Corp. v. Checker Cab

Company, 488 F.Supp. 1225 (D.C. Mich. 1980); Duncan v. SchusterGraham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978); Mims Crane Service,
Inc. v. Insley Manufacturing Corp., 226 So.2d 836 (Fla.App. 1969);
Castle Construction v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 425 So.2d 573
(Fla.App. 1982); May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
543 P.2d 1159 (Idaho 1975); Smith v. Ly, 498 So.2d 128 (La.App.

1986); State ex rel General Electric Co. v. Gaertner, 666 S.W.2d
764 (Mo. 1984); Winn v. Peter Bratti Associates, Inc., 364
N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y.S.C. 1975); Methodist Hospital of Brooklyn v.
Leon D. DeMatteis Construction, 413 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y.S.C. 1979);
McDermott v. City of New York, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y.App. 1980);
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Southridge Towers, 476 N.Y.S.2d 299
(N.Y.A.D. 1984).

See also, Annot., 57 A.L.R. 3d 867 (1974) and

cases cited therein.
Courts have also applied this general rule of law to
causes of action for contractual indemnity.

See, e.g., Venturi v.

Austin Company, 681 F.Supp. 584 (S.D.Ill. 1988); Jones v. Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 45 3 F.Supp. 527
(W.D.Penn. 1978); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v.
Tennessee Corporation, 421 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1970); Balboa
Insurance Company v. Zaleski, 532 A.2d 973 (Conn.App. 1987);
Chesapeake Utilities Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Company of Maryland, 401 A.2d 101 (Del.Super. 1979); Allstate
Insurance Company v. Metropolitan Dade County, 4 36 So.2d 97 6
(Fla.App. 1983); Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 487 A.2d 658 (Md.
1985); Simon v. Kansas City Rug Company, 460 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.
1970); Superintendent of Insurance v. Livestock Market, 709 S.W.2d
897 (Mo.App. 1986); Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316 (Mo.App.
1980); Fireman's Insurance Company of Newark, N.J, v. Antol, 471
N.E.2d 831 (Ohio App. 1984); Pate v. Tellepsen Construction Co.,
596 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.App. 1980).
The aforementioned general rule recognized by this and

other jurisdictions is directly applicable to the instant action.
The statute of limitations on Little America's cross-claim for
indemnity did not expire before Little America filed its claim
against Okland Construction.

Little America was not untimely in

asserting its claim for indemnity against Okland Construction.
The timing of an indemnity cause of action was examined
in the factually analogous case of Wolverine Insurance Co. v.
Tower Ironworks, Inc., 370 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966).

Plaintiff

Wolverine, a Michigan insurance company, sued as assignee and
subrogee of an Ohio corporation, Families of Columbus.
defendant, Tower, was a Rhode Island corporation.

The

On or before

July 5, 1955, pursuant to contract with Families, Tower designed
and installed a swimming pool on premises in Ohio owned by
Families.

On July 29, 1961, an individual, James Duckworth, dove

into the pool, struck his head, and broke his neck.

He brought

suit against Families on the ground that the pool was negligently
designed.

As Families1 insurer, Wolverine undertook the defense

and notified Tower of the suit with the request that Tower come in
and defend.

Tower declined and in 1964 Wolverine settled with

Duckworth for $30,000.
On November 12, 1965, Wolverine brought an action by
filing with the district court a complaint in six counts.

The

court determined that counts five and six of the complaint stated
a cause of action for common law indemnity that would be held to
have accrued when Wolverine settled with Duckworth in 1964. In
reaching this determination, the court applied the generally

accepted rule that the cause of action for common law indemnity
"accrues when the potential indemnitee suffers loss by paying the
injured person."

Id,, at 703.

The court's conclusion was supported by considering the
difficulties posed by the alternatives urged by the defendant -that the cause of action accrued when the negligent act was
performed or, at the latest, when the injury occurred.

The court

stated, "clearly it makes no sense to treat Duckworth's cause of
action against Tower as accruing before he was actually injured.
Similarly, we think, it makes no real sense to treat Families'
cause as accruing before then, at a time when the liability is
only potential and its nature purely speculative."

Id. at 704.

Under such circumstances the court found that it was "reluctant to
punish a litigant for failure to press his claim at an earlier
date, where had he done so, he would not have been entitled to a
judgment."

Id.

Moreover, the court recognized that if the period of
limitations began to run at the time of injury, Families would
face a dilemma of equally unsatisfactory implications.

If it were

for its own protection to institute an action against Tower
without waiting for Duckworth's possible claim to materialize, it
would be starting the litigation whose precondition might never
come into existence.

The court stated, "that is, the injured

person might not press his claim, might seek recovery on some
ground other than Tower's negligence, or might be barred by some
factor (such as contributory negligence) not pertinent to Tower."

Id.

Under this dilemma the court determined that the result would

be the institution of many untimely unnecessary lawsuits.
The reasoning expoused by Wolverine is dispositive of the
case at bar.

Clearly it makes no sense to treat Little America's

action for indemnity as accruing before plaintiff's cause of
action, which arose when he was injured in July, 1986. As such,
the statutory period of limitations under Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-25.5 should not allow Okland Construction to escape any
liability for its negligence.
POINT II.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-25.5 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Assuming, arguendo, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is
applicable to Little America's claim for indemnity against Okland
Construction, the statute is unconstitutional on several grounds.
First, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates Little America's right
of access to the courts.

The statute bars Little America from

seeking its claim for indemnity against Okland Construction prior
to its right to indemnity ever accrued.

Additionally, the statute

unconstitutionally denies owners of reality, upon discovery of a
defect, the right to sue the general contractor who designed,
planned, or supervised the construction, and that acts to
terminate all rights against that responsible party.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is additionally unconstitutional in that the statute's classification for immunity from
lawsuits violates equal protection.

The statute provides a

special and unusual immunity to the class identified in the

statute as persons "performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision of construction, or construction of such improvement
to real property."

This classification violates equal protection

because there is no sound basis upon which to distinguish the
favored class from owners which are specifically excluded by the
statute.
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates due
process because the statute bars Little America from bringing its
cause of action for indemnity before its cause of action accrued.
The statute abrogates the rights of citizens to their day in court
and indeed, in the case of those seeking indemnity for claims of
those injured, violates a vested and constitutionally protected
right.
A.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 Violates Little America's
Right of Access to the Courts.

A recent decision issued by this court is dispositive of
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5.

On December

31, 1985, this Court issued its opinion of Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), holding the Utah Product
Liability Statute of Repose, Utah Code Ann., §78-15-1 (1983),
violative of the "open courts" clause of Article I, Section 11 of
the Utah Constitution, as well as the Utah constitutional
prohibition against abolition of wrongful death actions, Article
XVT, Section 5.

Little America respectfully submits that this

Court's analysis in Berry is directly applicable to its
constitutional challenge to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5.
Berry was a wrongful death action instituted against the

manufacturer of an aircraft in which plaintiff's decedent was a
passenger at the time of the fatal crash.
three years old.

The plane was twenty-

The Products Liability Statute of Repose

purported, on its face, to bar the action before the crash ever
occurred.

The statute prohibited any action for recovery of

damages for personal injury, death, or damage to property more
than six years after the date of initial purchase or ten years
after manufacture.
This Court explained the nature of a statute of repose
and the constitutional limitations applicable thereto.

Such a

statute runs from a date unrelated to the date of injury and cuts
off the right of the injured party, no matter how diligent he may
be in pursuing his legal remedies.

In other words, the statute is

not directed to nuisance lawsuits.

It is directed to and

necessariJy affects meritorious claims and abrogates the right of
action long before the cause of action ever accrues.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (Utah's
"open courts" or "remedies" provision) is part of the Declaration
of Rights provision.

It declares that an individual shall have

the right of a "remedy by due course of law" for injury to "one's
person, property, or reputation."

This Court explained that the

guarantee applies even if the right that has been cut off had not
technically been vested.

Article I, Section 11 guarantees an

opportunity for redress granted in a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner, Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply
Assn., 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984), and that provision cannot be

reduced to "a useless appendage to the constitution.'1
P.2d at 675.

Berry, 717

This Court stated:
A plain reading of Section 3 1 also
establishes that the framers of the
Constitution intended that an individual
could not be arbitrarily deprived of
effective remedies designed to protect basic
individual rights. A constitutional
guarantee of access to the courthouse was
not intended by the founders to be an empty
gesture; individuals are also entitled to a
remedy by "due course of law" for injuries
to "person, property, or reputation."

The Legislature has the power to create new rules of law
and cut off existing remedies -- but that power is limited.

The

prerogative of the Legislature must be balanced against the
guarantees of Article I, Section 11, and this requires a two part
analysis.
Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides the injured
person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy.

The

Workers Compensation Act is an example of an acceptable
alternative.

Workers who were denied the right to sue their

employers were provided compensative benefits.

There was no such

alternative remedy in Berry, supra, and there is none in the
instant case.
Defendant Little America has been denied the right to
seek indemnity from Okland Construction, a party who entered into
an express contract to indemnify and hold Little America harmless
from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses,
including attorneys' fees growing out of their agreement to
construct the swimming pool and sauna at Little America Hotel.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 acts to terminate all rights Little
America has against Okland Construction for indemnification.
The second aspect of the analysis under Berry requires
consideration of the Legislature's motives.

The Legislature's

abrogation of a right of action under existing law may be
justified, even in the absence of an alternative remedy, only if
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
Legislature's action, in furtherance of that action, is not
arbitrary or unreasonable.
The Utah Products Liability Act considered in Berry
contained a unique provision (Utah Code Ann. §78-15-12) which
identified the legislative objective.

The statute proclaimed that

it was directed to the reduction of the cost of product liability
insurance and thus the cost of manufactured products.
This Court concluded that the statute was unreasonable
and arbitrary and, further, that the statute did not meet those
stated objectives.

The statute was unreasonable and arbitrary

because the cut-off periods provided (six and ten years) were not
related to the useful life of the products.
true in the instant case.

The same is patently

Seven years is not the useful life of

Little America's facilities or, for that matter, any building -even under fictionalized accelerated depreciation schedules.
Additionally, the Products statute did not vitiate, as
required for a determination of constitutionality, "wide-spread
social or economic evils."

Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. This Court

explained that the number of claims for damages arrived from

defective products had not dramatically increased in Utah.

Thus,

the number of claims barred by the statute could not significantly
affect insurance premium rates, particularly since rates are
established on a national basis and not on the experience of a
single state such as Utah.
unfavorable consequence:

Finally, the statute would not have

It would not vitiate but rather would

increase social evils; the statute would likely reduce the
incentive of the manufacturing industry to take safety precautions
in products having a useful life of more than six years.
Again, this Court's analysis in Berry is here applicable.
Nothing in the Legislative history of Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-25.5 suggests that the Legislature was motivated by the
same considerations which prompted passage of the Products
statute.

On the contrary, the Legislature was simply responding

to a special interest group.

In contrast to the Products statute,

the Construction Statute of Repose sets forth no explanation of
its objectives.

The transcript of the House proceedings suggests

that the Legislature was simply responding to a special interest
group which demanded unabashed immunity from liability.

The

transcript of the Senate proceedings suggests that the statute was
not even understood.

It was presented as a statute of

limitations and not as a statute of repose,
Even assuming arguendo that the motives of each statute
were the same, the Utah Construction Statute of Repose must fail
for the very reasons stated in Berry.

Studies have shown that

97.9 percent of the claims against architects and others

responsible for the condition of realty are brought within seven
years of substantial completion of the project.
Fall 1978, at 47-48.

FIC Quarterly,

After that time, injuries or damages are

more likely the result of improper maintenance or other factors
over which builders or architects have no control.

On its face,

the statute can thus have no appreciable effect upon the cost of
insurance premiums and the consequent cost to industry.
Also, the analysis in McGovern, The Variety, Polity, and
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30
Am.U.L.Rev. 579, at 595-96, upon which this court relied in Berry,
is necessarily applicable to the Construction Statute of Repose.
Insurance rates are set on a national scale and the statutefs
impact upon claims in Utah, already shown to be minimal, would
necessarily have no effect on insurance rates. Additionally, the
statute creates rather than minimizes an evil.

It necessarily

reduces the incentive to commit substantial resources for longterm building safety.

Accordingly, the statute before this Court

stands without justification, without sound reason for its
existence.
Additionally, Berry is applicable to the instant action
in that this court relied upon decisions of sister states which
have held realty statutes of repose violative of "open courts"
provisions:

Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Overland

Construction Co., Inc. v. Simons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979);
Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Assn., 349 N.W.2d
419 (S.D. 1984); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821

(Wyo. 1980); Berry, 717 P.2d at 678.

Furthermore, this Court

opined that the contrary authorities "have all but read those
('open courts') constitutional provisions out of their respective
Constitutions."

Id. at 678.

Moreover, this Court's decision in Berry also establishes
that this Court's earlier decision in Good v. Christiansen, 527
P.2d 223 (Utah 1974), sustaining the constitutionality of the
seven-year statute of repose is not conclusive upon the matter.
The general rule was stated in Malan v. Lewis, 69 3 P.2d 661,
668-69 (Utah 1984):

". . . a ruling that a statute is

constitutional does not thereafter become immune from
reconsideration."

The effect of the Good decision was

specifically noted in Berry.

This Court explained that the filing

in Good was a one-sentence conclusionary statement that the
statute was constitutional, that there was no way of determining
the basis of the ruling, and that the decision "has little
persuasive effect." Berry, 717 P. 2d at 683,,
B.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is a Class Legislation
and Violates Equal Protection.

Irrational classifications which serve no sound statutory
purpose are prohibited by:

the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, which mandates equal protection of the laws; Article
I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that the
government is founded on the authority of the people "for their
equal protection and benefit;" and Article I, Section 24 of the
Utah Constitution, which provides that "all laws of general nature
shall have uniform operation."

All provisions require that all

similarly circumstanced persons shall be treated alike.
The test of constitutionality for a statute which accords
different treatment to persons by placing them in classes was
stated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971):
A classification "must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike."
The test in this state was set forth in State v. Mason,
94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938):
A denial of the law's equal protection
presupposes an unreasonable discrimination
between those included and those excluded
from the Act whether the Act confers a
privilege or a right or imposes a duty or an
obligation. . . . For that reason, to be
unconstitutional the discrimination must be
unreasonable or arbitrary. A classification
is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its
inclusion or exclusion features so long as
there is some basis for the differentiation
between classes or subject matters included
as compared to those excluded from Its
operation, provided the differentiation
bears a reasonable relation to the purposes
to be accomplished by the Act.
*

*

*

The objects and purposes of a law present
the touchstone for determining proper and
improper classifications.
The Utah Construction Statute of Repose creates classes
which fail to satisfy the constitutional mandate.

Directly

relevant to the instant action, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5
specifically excludes owners of the real estate from its benefits.
The statute immunizes only contractors and architects, i.e., those

who design, plan, and construct the improvement.

The transcript

of the Legislative proceedings makes plain that the solitary
legislative objective was to respond to the demands of a special
interest group, i.e., contractors and architects, and to terminate
their liability —

irrespective of their degree of culpability

—

upon the conclusion of seven years.
The discriminatory character of the statute is apparent
on its face and is constitutionally invalid under either "minimum
scrutiny" or the rational basis standard of review established in
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1981) (Whether the class bears a reasonable relation to the
purpose of the legislation).

The authorities have concluded that

it is difficult to rationally permit the owner to be exposed to
liability for the prescribed period of years, when at the same
time the builder or designer of the premises is immunized from
liability even before the cause of action accrues.
The seminal decision was authored by Mr. Justice
Schaeffer in Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).

The

statute of repose under consideration was the same as that before
this Court.

The favored class was those who perform and furnish

the "design, planning, supervision of construction, or
construction of improvements to real property."

Holding the

statute unconstitutional, the court hypothesized the very
circumstances before this Court:
More important is the fact that all of those
whose negligence in connection with the

construction of an improvement to real
estate might result in damage to property or
injury to person more than four years [the
period provided in the Illinois state] after
construction is completed, the statute
singles out the architect and the
contractor, and grants them immunity. It is
not at all inconceivable that the owner or
person in control of such an improvement
might be held liable for damage or injury
that results from a defective condition for
which the architect or contractor is in fact
is responsible. Not only is the owner or
person in control given no immunity; the
statute takes away his action for indemnity
against the architect or contractor. Id. at
591.
The situation addressed in Skinner is identical to the
case at bar.

The Utah statute provides no immunity to owners such

as Little America who might be found liable for plaintiff's
injuries that are results from a defective condition which Okland
Construction is responsible.

Moreover, the statute arbitrarily

takes away Little America!s action for indemnity against the
contractor, Okland Construction.
The authorities have lent their approbation to Justice
Schaeffer1s analysis.

Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568, 572 (Hawaii

1973); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, 241 S.E.2d 739,
741 (S.C. 1978); Kallas Millwork Corporation v. Square D Co., 225
N.W.2d 454, 459 (Wis. 1975); Loyal Order of Moose v. Cavaness, 563
P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Henderson Clay Products, Inc. v. Edgar Wood
& Associates, Inc., 451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982)
In Kallas Millwork Corporation v. Square D Co., supra,
the court could not find "any real differences to distinguish the
favored class -- those persons who perform and furnish the

'design, planning, supervision of construction or construction' of
improvements to real property -- from other classes, such as
materialmen, who are ignored by the statute, and owners and
occupants, who are specifically excepted."
458.

Kallas, 255 N.W.2d at

Both Fujioka v. Kam, supra, and Loyal Order of Moose v.

Cavaness, supra, reached a similar conclusion.

The Fuj ioka court

concluded that it was "unable to see any rational basis for
treating the engineer and the contractor differently from the
owners under the same circumstances."

Fujioka, 514 P.2d at 571.

In Loyal Order of Moose v. Cavaness, adopting the analysis in
Fuj ioka, the court explained:
It is clear that the classification does not
rest upon some reasonable consideration of
differences (between the classes under the
same circumstances), which have a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the
legislation. Nor is the classification
founded upon a reasonable distinction or
difference necessitated by state policy. A
statute making such an unsupportable
classification fails to meet the
requirements of the Equal Protection
Guaranty. Loyal Order of Moose, 56 3 P.2d at
148.
The classifications set forth in the Utah Construction
Statute of Response likewise fail to meet Equal Protection.

The

discriminatory character of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is apparent
on its face and is constitutionally invalid.

There is no rational

basis for treating the favored class differently from the owners
under the same circumstances.

C.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25,5 Violates Due Process.

Both Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Section VII of Article I of the Utah Constitution
provide that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law.
The due process constraints where discussed in Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902).

Although the court considered a

statute of limitations and not a statute which, as in the instant
case, purports to bar claims before they come into existence, the
Court's observations are instructive:
[I]t may be properly conceded that all
statutes of limitation must proceed on the
idea that the party has full opportunity
afforded him to try his right in the courts.
A statute could not bar the existing rights
of claimants without affording this
opportunity; if it should attempt to do so,
it would not be a statute of limitations,
but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights
arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport
of its provisions. It is essential that
such statutes allow a reasonable time that
after they take effect for the commencement
of suits upon existing causes of action.
The Utah Construction Statute of Repose violates the
foregoing provision in that it does not merely limit the time
within which an action must be brought, but removes the remedy.
Assuming arguendo Utah Code Ann.

§78-12-25.5 applies to the

instant action, it bars Little America from bringing its claim for
indemnity even before that claim has accrued.
The essential requirement of due process is that every
citizen shall be afforded his day in court.

Celebrity Club, Inc.

v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982).

It

is the policy of this state to resolve any doubt by permitting the
parties the opportunity to prove their claims.

The effect of Utah

Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 denies Little America its day in court.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates due process.
CONCLUSION
Little America's cross-claim against Okland Construction
is not barred by the Construction Statute of Repose, Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25.5 (1967).

Little America's cross-claim for

indemnity is separate and distinct from and is not governed by the
statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's underlying
action.

Moreover, Little America's claim for indemnity, based

upon an express contract with Okland Construction, is governed by
the six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on
written contracts, Utah Code Ann. §78-12.23 (1953).

Finally,

Little America's claim for indemnity, under general principles,
does not accrue and the limitations period does not begin to run
until the litigation against it has ended or liability, if any,
has been discharged.
Even assuming arguendo Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 applies
to Little America's cross-claim for indemnity, the statute is
unconstitutional.

The statute violates Little America's

constitutional guarantee of right to access to the courts.
statute's classifications violate equal protection.

The

Furthermore,

the statute violates due process because it bars Little America
from bringing its cause of action for indemnity before it accrued.

For the foregoing reasons and upon the authorities cited,
Little America respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's decision denying Little America's right of
indemnification against Okland Construction and declare Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25.5 unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted this

/
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of March, 1989.

STRONG S/HAMNI

Attorneys for Third-Party
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UTAH STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-25.5 INJURY DUE TO DEFECTIVE DESIGN OR
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY -- WITHIN SEVEN
YEARS.
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for any
injury to the person, of for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for damages sustained on
account of such injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property more
than seven years after the completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or any other legal
entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall mean the date of
issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the owner, architect, engi
neer or other agents, or the date of the owner's use or possession of the improve
ment on real property.
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person in the actual
possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for
which it is proposed to bring an action.
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise
prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-23 WITHIN SIX YEARS - MESNE PROFITS OF
REAL PROPERTY - INSTRUMENT IN WRITING - DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDS TO VICTIM.
Within six years:
(1) an action for the mesne profits of real property.
(2) an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in §78-12-22.
(3) an action instituted under §78-11-12.5 regarding distribution of criminal
proceeds to any victim.

A3

UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §2 [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on
their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform
their government as the public welfare may require.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §7 [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §11 [Courts open « Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §24 [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

A4

UNITED STATES CONSITUTION
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdicition
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiciton of equal protection of the laws.
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ADDENDUM II
CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST MARTIN STERN, JR., AND
AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOCIATES AND OKLAND
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Paul M. Belnap, 0279
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Attorneys for Defendant
Little America
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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~ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
CROSS CLAIM AGAINST MARTIN
STERN, JR. AND AIA ARCHITECT
& ASSOCIATES AND OKLAND
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

vs.
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, MARTIN STERN, JR. and
AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOCIATES,
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., a
Utah corporation, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC., a Utah
corporation, HIGHAM-HILTON
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.,
a Utah corporation and
JOHN DOES I THROUGH III,

Civil No.

C87-268

Judge David S. Young

Defendants.
By way of cross claim against defendant Martin Stern,
Jr., and AIA Architect & Associates and Okland Construction
Company, the defendant Little America Hotel Corporation alleges
that:

A7

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

In the above entitled matter the plaintiff has filed

suits against Little America Hotel Corporation and the cross
claim defendants and other defendants alleging injuries and
damages sustained by virtue of an accident that occurred in
a swimming pool at defendant Little America Hotel's Corporation
facilities in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

When defendant Little America Hotel Corporation was

made a party to the aforementioned litigation, it tendered
its defense in the above matter to cross claim defendants
Martin Stern, Jr., and AIA Architects and Associates, and
Okland Construction Company.
3.

The tender of defense was based upon the fact that

Little America Hotel Corporation entered into a contract with
the cross claim defendants and as part of said contract, said
cross claim defendants agreed to indemnify and hold Little
America Hotel Corporation harmless from and against all claims,
damages, losses and expenses including attorney's fees growing
out of their agreement to design and construct the swimming
pool at the hotel facility of defendant.
4.

Based upon the agreement between the parties, defendant

Little America Hotel Corporation is entitled to a judgment
over against cross claim defendants for complete indemnity,
-2-

A8

attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in defending this action.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
5.

Should a judgment enter against the defendant Little

America Hotel Corporation and in favor of the plaintiff based
upon an alleged act or omission to act on the part of Little
America Hotel Corporation, then such conduct on its part was
passive and secondary in nature to the active and primary
nature of the acts and omissions to act of cross claim defendants
entitling Little America Hotel Corporation to a judgment over
against said cross claim defendants by way of implied indemnity.
WHEREFORE, Little America Hotel Corporation prays judgment
of indemnity and/or implied indemnity against Martin Stern,
Jr., and AIA Architect and Associates, and Okland Construction
Company, for its costs, attorney's fees, and such other and
further relief as is appropriate.
DATED this /

'

day of /^C^4^^^^r
STRONG

, 198 8.

{/HANNI

few?
Paul to. Be lnap

-3-
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
*

4

*

*

dMAC hsJb

5
6

JAMES SANCHEZ,
PLAINTIFF,

7
8
9

CIVIL NO. C-87-268
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO
CROSS CLAIM OF LITTLE
AMERICA

-VSLITTLE AMERICA MOTEL,
INC., ET AL,

10
11

DEFENDANTS

12
* * *

13
14
15

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 29TH DAY

16

OF AUGUST, 1 9 8 8 , COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9 : 5 8 O'CLOCK

17

A . M . , THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE

18

COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT

19

LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE

20

HONORABLE DAVID S .

21

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH.

YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

22
23

*

*

*

24

FILED IN CLERK'S OrFiCE

25

Sr.U UK3 County Utah

NOV 1 C 19S Q
s //
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E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MATTHEW J . STOREY
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOC.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
4 0 0 1 SOUTH 700 EAST
SUITE # 5 0 0
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84107

FOR THE DEFENDANT,
OAKLAND CONST. CO.

DWIGHT C. PACKARD
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
35 POST OFFICE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84101

FOR THE DEFENDANT,
LITTLE AMERICA:

PAUL BELNAP
STRONG & HANNI
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
9 EXCHANGE PLACE
SUITE #600
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

FOR THE DEFENDANT,
MARTIN STERN, JR.
AIA ARCHITECTS &
ASSOC:

84111

JEFFREY SILVESTRINI
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
525 EAST 100 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84102

I N D E X

COUNSELS' ARGUMENTS TO THE COURT

PAGE 3
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L ? . O C E E D I _ N G S
JUDGE YOUNG:

THE RECORD MAY SHOW THIS IS THE TIME

SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER OF JAMES SANCHEZ VS.
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL,

C-87-268.

THE MATTER HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO BE REPORTED.
STATE YOU APPEARANCES FOR THE RECORD, PLEASE, COUNSEL.
MR. PACKARD:

DWIGHT PACKARD APPEARING ON BEHALF OF

THE MOVING PARTY, OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
MR. BELNAP:

PAUL BELNAP APPEARING ON BEHALF OF LITTLE

AMERICA.
MR. STOREY:

MATTHEW STOREY ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF,

SANCHEZ.
MR. SILVESTRINI:

JEFF SILVESTRINI ON BEHALF OF MARTIN

STERN AIA ARCHITECT AND ASSOCIATES.
JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU.

MR. PACKARD?

MR. PACKARD:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

AS YOU WILL RECALL,

APPROXIMATELY A MONTH AGO YOU DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMS IN THIS ACTION AGAINST THE PARTIES WHO PARTICIPATED
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL TOWER BASED
UPON THE STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5

UTAH CODE

ANNOTATED.
WE'RE HERE TODAY ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO LITTLE AMERICA'S CROSS CLAIMS FOR INDEMNIFICATION
AGAINST OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.

THE QUESTION FACING

THE COURT THEN IS DOES SECTION 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 BAR ALL ACTIONS
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AGAINST THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR OF A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
INCLUDING A CROSS CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION BY THE OWNER
OF THE PROJECT.
YOUR HONOR, HAS THE COURT HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW
THE MEMORANDA SUBMITTED?
JUDGE YOUNG:

I HAVE.

MR. PACKARD:

IN THAT MEMORANDA I'VE CITED TO THE PERRY

V. PIONEER WHOLESALES CASE.

IN THAT CASE THE PERRY COURT

SET OUT A GENERAL RULE AS TO WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
INDEMNIFICATION ARISES, HOWEVER, THE COURT SET OUT AN
EXCEPTION TO THAT GENERAL RULE AND STATED THAT WHEN A
SPECIFIC STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD THAT SEEKS ULTIMATE
REPOSE CAUSES OF ACTION, SUCH AS 78-12-25.5, THAT ACTION
WILL CONTROL OVER A GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATION EVEN TO
CUT OFF AN INDEMNIFICATION ACTION THAT TECHNICALLY HAS NOT
ACCRUED.
ALSO, IN THE GOOD V. CHRISTENSEN CASE, A CASE
WHICH SPECIFICALLY DEALS WITH THAT STATUE, THE COURT STATED
THAT THE STATUTE PREVENTS THE OWNER, AS WELL AS OTHERS,
FROM SUING THE DESIGNER, PLANNER, SUPERVISOR OR CONTRACTOR.
THEREFORE, WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT BASED UPON THOSE TWO CASES
ALONE THE COURT CAN RULE AND DISMISS LITTLE AMERICA'S CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION.

IF THAT LANGUAGE FROM THOSE

CASES IS NOT SUFFICIENT THEN WE WILL HAVE TO GO FURTHER.
AGAIN, IN THE GOOD V. CHRISTENSEN CASE THE COURT
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DISCUSSED WHAT CAUSES OF ACTION REMAIN AGAINST THE OWNER
OF A PROJECT IF THE BUILDERS ARE NO LONGER INVOLVED IN THAT
ACTION.

AND THE COURT SAID THAT THE ORIGINAL OWNER CAN

BE SUED FOR HIS OWN TORTS, IF ANY, THEREFORE, IF LITTLE
AMERICA DOES HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION
AGAINST OAKLAND IT IS AS A RESULT OF THEIR OWN TORTS.
NOW, IF WE HAVE TO INDEMNIFY THEM FOR THEIR OWN
TORTS, AS THEY PURPORT THE CLAUSE OF THE CONTRACT REQUIRES
THEM TO DO, THEN THAT CLAUSE VIOLATES SECTION 13-8-1 BECAUSE
AN INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE CANNOT REQUIRE THE CONTRACTOR
TO INDEMNIFY THE OWNER FOR ITS SOLE NEGLIGENCE.

OKAY, SO

BEING AS THAT IS THE CASE, LITTLE AMERICA DOES NOT HAVE
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST MY CLIENT.
IF THE COURT HAS NO QUESTIONS I'LL SUBMIT IT
TO MR. BELNAP AND THEN REPLY TO WHAT ARGUMENT HE HAS IN
OPPOSITION TO WHAT I'VE ARGUED HERE.
JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU, MR. PACKARD.

MR. BELNAP?
MR. BELNAP:

YOUR HONOR, THERE'S BEEN A NUMBER OF CASES

CITED IN BOTH MEMORANDUMS THAT GO BOTH DIRECTIONS ON THE
QUESTION OF WHEN DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGIN TO
RUN WITH RESPECT TO AN INDEMNITY ACTION.

THERE ARE CASES

THAT SAY IF THE UNDERLYING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE
PERSONAL INJURY ACTION HAS RUN SO HAS AN INDEMNITY CAUSE
OF ACTION RUN.

THERE ARE CASES THAT GO TO THE CONTRARY,
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WHICH WE FEEL ARE THE MAJORITY POSITION, THAT BASICALLY
SAY—AND IF YOU THINK ABOUT THE REASON FOR THEM THEY MAKE
SENSE—AND SAY THAT AN INDEMNITY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR STATUTE
OF LIMITATION PURPOSES DOES NOT START TO RUN UNTIL THE PERSON
REQUESTING INDEMNIFICATION IS CALLED UPON TO PAY OUT MONEY
IT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT SHOULD HAVE PAID UNDER EQUITABLE
INDEMNITY OR, IN THIS CASE, UNDER CONTRACTURAL INDEMNITY.
AND SO THE SIMPLE ISSUE AS WE SEE IT BEFORE THE
COURT IS THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS CASE FOR INDEMNITY
BEGAN WHEN LITTLE AMERICA WAS SUED BY MR. SANCHEZ IN 1987
FOR INJURIES HE SUSTAINED IN 1986.

THAT IS THE FIRST TIME

THAT A CLAIM WAS MADE AGAINST US.

AND IN THAT CLAIM IT

HAS BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR, OAKLAND
CONSTRUCTION, WAS NEGLIGENT AND THUS BRINGS INTO PLAY THE
CONTRACTURAL PROVISION THAT SAYS IF A CLAIM IS MADE AGAINST
LITTLE AMERICA YOU WILL STEP IN AND HOLD US HARMLESS FROM
THAT CLAIM, YOU'LL DEFEND IT, AND YOU'LL INDEMNIFY US IF
THAT IS CAUSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY YOUR OWN NEGLIGENCE.
WE'RE NOT STANDING HERE AND ASKING TO BE INDEMNIFIED FOR
OUR SOLE NEGLIGENCE.
RIGHT.

THE CONTRACT DOES NOT GIVE US THAT

THE CONTRACT SAYS THAT YOU'LL INDEMNIFY US IF YOU'RE

NEGLIGENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART.
JUDGE YOUNG:

ACCORDING TO YOUR INTERPRETATION THEN

ANY CAUSE OF ACTION THAT ALLEGES ANY DEFECT IN THE
CONSTRUCTION THAT OCCURS AT ANY TIME IN THE TOTAL OPERATION
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OF THE LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CAN, THROUGH THE INDEMNITY
PROVISION, INCORPORATE OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION WITH THAT CAUSE
OF ACTION.
MR. BELNAP:

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

CONTRACT NEGOTIATED FOR ON A $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
ARMS LENGTH.

THAT WAS A
PROJECT AT

IF YOU LOOK THROUGH THE CONTRACT I T ' S TOTALLY

CLEAR THAT THAT'S THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.

FROM THE FIRST

PAGE OF THE GENERAL CONDITIONS ON THROUGH THE END WHERE
IT SAYS THE CONTRACTOR IS TOTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WORK,
THE WORK I S DEFINED IN VERY BROAD TERMS.

IT GOES ON TO

SAY THAT YOU'LL INDEMNIFY US, IT GOES ON TO SAY THAT YOU'LL
GET INSURANCE TO PROTECT FOR THOSE INDEMNIFICATION PURPOSES.
JUDGE YOUNG:

ISN'T IT ANTICIPATED THAT WOULD BE DURING

THE PERIOD OF CONSTRUCTION AND A PERIOD OF, I SUPPOSE,
OCCUPATION BY THE TENANT FOR SOME TIME THEREAFTER AND A
SHORT PERIOD SO THAT IT DEALS WITH FAULTY CONSTRUCTION?
I MEAN, SHOULD OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION HAVE AN UMBRELLA POLICY
AD INFINITUM FOR THIS PROJECT SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE THE
BUILDERS OF IT IN ORDER TO INDEMNIFY LITTLE AMERICA?
MR. BELNAP:

LET ME GO BACK TO THE FACTS AND I'LL

RESPOND TO THE COURT'S QUESTION.
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. BELNAP:

OKAY.
IN THIS CASE, JUDGE, LITTLE AMERICA HAS

A SWIMMING POOL INSIDE OF THE HOTEL.

MR. SANCHEZ CAME TO

THE HOTEL TO STAY WITH HIS FAMILY AND HE ARRIVED THE DAY
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BEFORE THE INCIDENT.
THE INCIDENT.

HE GOT INTO THE POOL THE NIGHT BEFORE

HE USED IT BRIEFLY.

THE NEXT DAY HE GOT

INTO IT AGAIN, USED IT BRIEFLY AND THEN WENT AND HAD
BREAKFAST WITH HIS CHILDREN, CAME BACK TO THE POOL AREA
AFTER HAVING BEEN IN IT TWICE, AND HE WENT AND GOT IN THE
SAUNA AT THAT TIME.

AND HE GENERALLY CLAIMS THAT HE WAS

IN THE SAUNA FOR A SUFFICIENT LENGTH OF TIME THAT IT CAUSED
HIM TO BE DELIRIOUS OR TO NOT BE IN TOTAL CONTROL OF HIS
MENTAL FACULTIES SUCH THAT WHEN HE CAME OUT OF THE SUANA
HE WAS HOT, HE WAS NOT THINKING STRAIGHT AS HE ALLEGES IN
HIS COMPLAINT, AND WENT OVER TO THE POOL, DOVE IN AND BROKE
HIS NECK.
IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE SAUNA WAS IMPROPERLY
CONSTRUCTED, WHICH IS A TOTAL PART OF THE JOB OF OAKLAND
AS THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO PUT THAT SAUNA IN AND SEE THAT
IT WAS CONSTRUCTED PROPERLY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANS
AND SPECIFICATIONS.

THAT'S CLAIMED BY VIRTUE OF IT NOT

HAVING SOME SORT OF A TIMING DEVICE ON IT AND ALSO NOT HAVING
WARNING SIGNS.

IT'S ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SWIMMING POOLS,

OR THE SWIMMING POOL, WAS NOT PROPERLY SIGNED AS FAR AS
WARNINGS AND AS FAR AS DEPTH MARKINGS GO AND THE POOL AND
THE SAUNA WERE IN THE SAME CONDITION AS WHEN OAKLAND
CONSTRUCTION EITHER CONSTRUCTED OR SUPERVISED THEIR
CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOTEL.
SO IF YOU LOOK—IN ANSWERING THE COURT'S QUESTION,

A19

8

IN VIEW OF THOSE FACTS, IF YOU LOOK TO THE CONTRACT TERMS,
TO THE TYPE OF CONTRACT THAT'S INVOLVED, AND TO THE INSURANCE
PROVISIONS THAT REQUIRE OAKLAND TO TAKE OUT INSURANCE FOR
THE BENEFIT OF THOSE INDEMNIFIED, WE THINK IT IS REASONABLE
THAT THE CONTRACT BE ENFORCED ON ITS FACE AND THAT THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CASES CITED IN OAKLAND'S MEMORANDUM
IN THIS CASE, NONE OF THOSE DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WHERE
THERE IS AN EXPRESSED CONTRACT SUCH AS OCCURRED IN THE SHELL
V. BRINKERHOFF CASE WHICH IS NOT IDENTICAL LANGUAGE BUT
IMPORTS THE SAME REQUIREMENTS THAT WE'RE ASKING THE COURT
TO ENFORCE IN THIS CASE.
JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU, MR. BELNAP.

MR. PACKARD:

YOUR HONOR, TWO EXCEPTIONS TO LITTLE

AMERICA'S ARGUMENT WOULD BE TO IGNORE THE LANGUAGE OF THE
PERRY V. WHOLESALE CASE.

WHATEVER IT IS IT'S QUITE EXPLICIT.

IT CUTS OFF AN INDEMNITY ACTION THAT IS TECHNICALLY NOT
ACCRUED UNDER A STATUTE OF REPOSE SUCH AS 78-12-25.5.
AGAIN, WITH RESPECT TO HIS CONTRACTURAL
INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS, THE GOOD V. CHRISTENSEN CASE MAKES "
IT CLEAR THE OWNER MAY ONLY BE SUED FOR HIS OWN TORTS, SUCH
AS, THE LANDOWNER WOULD HAVE A DUTY TO HIS BUSINESS INVITEES
TO MAKE A REASONABLE INSPECTION TO MAKE THE PREMISES SAFE.
NOW, THAT ARISES AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PROJECT AFTER THEY TAKE POSSESSION.

IF WE'RE REQUIRED

TO INDEMNIFY LITTLE AMERICA FOR THOSE KINDS OF CAUSES OF
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ACTIONS SUCH AS INSPECTING US AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY
NEED A SIGN ABOUT DIVING INTO THE POOL THEN WE ARE
INDEMNIFYING THEM FOR THEIR SOLE NEGLIGENCE.
THAT CLAUSE VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

AND THAT MAKES

THEREFORE, I

SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THE COURT WOULD DISMISS THE CROSS
CLAIMS.
JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU, MR. PACKARD.

ANYONE ELSE DESIRING TO BE HEARD ON THIS?
MR. STOREY:

NOTHING, YOUR HONOR, OTHER THAN TO SAY

IT IS OUR POSITION WE SUPPORT MR. BELNAP'S ARGUMENT ON THE
AUTHORITY OF THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE.
JUDGE YOUNG:

AND MR. SILVESTRINI, WHERE DO YOU STAND?

MR. SILVESTRINI:

IF I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE

I'LL GO FOR MR. PACKARD.
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. BELNAP:

ALL RIGHT.
JUDGE, I NOTICED IN REVIEWING OUR

MEMORANDUM THAT WE MIS-CITED THE SHELL CASE, GAVE YOU THE
WRONG PAGE NUMBER.

I BROUGHT A COPY OF THAT DECISION FOR

THE COURT IF YOU'D LIKE TO HAVE IT.
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. BELNAP:

I'D BE HAPPY TO SEE THE DECISION.
I ALSO BROUGHT A COPY OF THE DECISION

OF THE WILLIAM V. KENNECOTT CASE CITED IN THE DEFENDANT'S
REPLY MEMORANDUM WHICH WE THINK ALSO SUPPORTS THE FACT THAT
THIS INDEMNIFICATION CONTRACT IN THIS CASE IS ENFORCEABLE
AS STATED IN THESE CASES BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
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JUDGE YOUNG:

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION, OAKLAND

CONSTRUCTION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE CROSS
CLAIM OF LITTLE AMERICA WILL BE GRANTED.

I WILL READ THESE

CASES AFTERWARDS AND IF I FELL THAT I SHOULD MODIFY MY
DECISION I'LL ADVISE COUNSEL.

AT THIS POINT THE DECISION

IS GRANTED.
MR. BELNAP:

YOUR HONOR, MAY WE REQUEST THAT THIS BE

CERTIFED AS A FINAL ORDER?
JUDGE YOUNG:

WHAT'S THE STATUS OF THE OTHER ORDERS

THAT WERE GRANTED IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
MR. PACKARD:

THEY WERE CERTIFIED.

JUDGE YOUNG:

YES, YOU MAY AND I'D BE HAPPY TO HAVE

THIS ONE CERTIFIED AS WELL.
MR. PACKARD:

OKAY.

MR. SILVESTRINI:
JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU.

THANK YOU, JUDGE.

THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN.

(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED).

* * *
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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

SS.

I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I
AM A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH;
THAT AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED
THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME
AND PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN
SHORTHAND THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD
THEREIN; AND THAT THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID
SHORTHAND NOTES INTO TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING
TRANSCRIPTION IS A FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION
OF THE SAME.

EILEEN/ M. AMEROSE,'C.S.R.

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
JANUARY 14TH, 1992.

Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R.
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ADDENDUM IV
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AS TO
CROSS-CLAIMS OF LITTLE AMERICA
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Donald J. Purser, 2663
Dwight C. Packard, 5005
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
A Professional Corporation
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
Attorneys for Defendant
Okland Construction Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES SANCHEZ,
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY AS TO CROSS-CLAIMS
OF LITTLE AMERICA

Plaintiff,
V.

LITTLE AMERICA MOTEL, INC.,
a Utah corporation; LITTLE
AMERICA REFINING CO., INC.,
a Utah corporation, d/b/a
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL; MARTIN
STERN, JR. & ASSOCIATES;
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., a
Utah corporation; ROCKY
MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC.; a Utah
corporation; HIGHAM-HILTON
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.,
a Utah corporation and JOHN
DOES I through III,

Civil No. C87-268
(Judge David S. Young)

Defendants.

Defendant Okland Construction Company's Motion for Summary
Judgment as to the Cross-Claims of Defendants Little America came
on for hearing on August 29, 1988, the Honorable David S. Young,
District Court Judge, presiding.
A25

Appearances were made on behalf

of Defendant Okland, Defendants Little America, Defendant Martin
Stern, Jr. & Associates, and the Plaintiff, by their respective
counsel.

The Court heard argument and found that Section 78-12-

25.5, Utah Code Annotated was a bar to Little America's CrossClaims against Okland;
WHEREFORE, for good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered
that summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Okland
Construction Company, and pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court further expressly determines that
there is no just reason for delay and therefore directs the entry
of final judgment dismissing with prejudice the cross-claims of
Defendants Little America against Okland Construction Company.
DATED this

day of September, 1988.
THE COURT:

David S. /Sfour
D i s t r i c t (gcn^ft Ju^c

A 7 7 EST
H. D!XON HM^OLEY
By

700645.DCP
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

,

I hereby certify that on the "St)**
J_f_5* day of September, 1988, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
JUDGMENT

SUMMARY

IN FAVOR OF OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AS TO CROSS-

CLAIMS OF LITTLE AMERICA was served upon the following parties by
placing the same in the United States mails, postage prepaid, and
addressed as follows:
Paul Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lee Henning
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jeff Silvestrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Theodore Kanell
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dale F. Gardiner
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

•k^o;. a Q* ki»X£s_

700645.DCP
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ADDENDUM V
STANDARD AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER
LITTLE AMERICA AND CONTRACTOR
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
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THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS

AIA Document

A101

Standard Form of Agreement Between
Owner and Contractor
where the basis of payment is a

STIPULATED SUM
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES; CONSULTATION WITH
AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURACED WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMPLETION OR MODIFICATION

Use only with the latest Edition of AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for

Construction.

This document has been approved and endorsed by The Associated General Contractors of America.

AGREEMENT
made this
£l£v£NTt+
Hundred and
Seventy-five

day of

September

in the year of Nineteen

BETWEEN the Owner:

LITTLE AMERICA REFINING CO.

and the Contractor:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
1978 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

the Project:

LITTLE AMERICA SALT LAKE

the Architect:

MARTIN STERN, J R . AIA ARCHITECT AND ASSOCIATES
9 34 8 S a n t a Monica B o u l e v a r d
B e v e r l y H i l l s , C a l i f o r n i a 90210

The Owner and the Contractor agree as set forth below.

ARTICLE 1
THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement, Conditions of the Contract (General, Supplementary and other
Conditions), Drawings, Specifications, all Addenda issued prior to execution of this Agreement and all Modifications
issued subsequent thereto. These form the Contract, and all are as fully a part of the Contract as if attached to this
Agreement or repeated herein. An enumeration of the Contract Documents appears in Article 7.
ARTICLE 2
THE WORK
The Contractor shall perform all the Work required by the Contract Documents for

Little

America

(Here insert the caption descriptive ot the Work as used on other Contract Documents )

Salt Lake and additions and modifications to Little America Salt
Lake, 500 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

ARTICLE 3
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION
The Work to be performed under this Contract shall be commenced

September

15 ,

1975

afleKacrapJerai
(Here insert any special provisions for liquidated

damages relating to failure to complete on time )

and be delivered to the Owner in a state of substantial completion (
defined in the General Conditions) as soon as possible but in not le
time than scheduled hereafter:
at 600 consecutive calendar days from the commencement
date above, Guest Room floors 4 through 15 inclusive;
Parking Levels P-l and P-2? floor 2; and floor 1, except
for the areas bounded by column grid lines 1 to 5.1 and
C to G, 2 to 6 and H to K, and meeting rooms #3, #4 and
#6.
at 740 consecutive calendar days from the commencement
date above, all remaining portions of the project.
(continued on attached sheet 2A)

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS

AIA Document A201

General Conditions of the Contract
for Construction
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LECAL CONSEQUENCES: CONSULTATION
WITH AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS MODIFICATION

TABLE OF ARTICLES
9. PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION

1. CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
2. ARCHITECT

10. PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND
PROPERTY

3. OWNER
4. CONTRACTOR

11. INSURANCE

5. SUBCONTRACTORS

12. CHANGES IN THE WORK

6. SEPARATE CONTRACTS
7. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

13. UNCOVERING AND CORRECTION
OF WORK

8. TIME

14. TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT

This document has been approved and endorsed by The Associated General Contractors of America.
Copyright 1911, 1915,1918, 192S, 1937,1951, 1958. 1961, 1963, 1966, 1967, © 1970 by The American Institute of Architects, 1735
New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006. Reproduction of the material herein or substantial quotation of its provisions without permission of the AIA violates the copyright laws of the United States and will be subiect to legal prosecution.
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INDEX
Acceptance of Defective or Non-Conforming Work
13.3
Access to Work
2.2.3
Accident Prevention
2.2.4, 10
Addendum, Definition of
1.1.1
Additional Costs, Claims for
12.2.1
Additional Work
12
Administration of the Contract
2.2
Agreement, Extent ot
1.1, 1.2
Allowances. Cash
4.8.1
Applications for Payment
2.2.5, 9.2.1, 9.3.1, 9.3.3, 9.4.1,
9.4.2,9.5.1,9.6.1,9.7.2
Arbitration, Owner-Contractor Claims and
Disputes
2.2.6 through 2.2.12, 7.10
ARCHITECT
2
Architect, Definition of
2.1
Architect's Access to the Work
2.2.3
Architect's Authority . . . 2 . 2 . 2 , 2.2.12, 2.2.14, 2.2.17, 4.17, 12.1.2
Architect's Authority to Reject Work
2.2.12
Architect's Decisions
2.2.6 through 2.2.12
Architect's Interpretations
1.2^,2.2.6 through 2.2.11, 12.1.6
Architect's Full-Time Project Representative
2.2.16
Architect's Status
2.2
Architect's Visits to Site
2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.15, 7.8, 9.7
Bonds, Contract (Performance, Labor and
Material Payment)
Builder's Risk Insurance (See Property Insurance)

7.5
11.3

Cash Allowances
4.8.1
Certificates for
Payment
2.2.5, 2.2.15, 5.4.2, 9.4, 9 J . I , 9.6.1, 9.7.2
CHANCES IN THE WORK
12
Changes, Minor
2.2.14, 12.3
Change Orders
2.2.14, 4.8.1, 12.1
Change Orders, Definition of
12.1.2
Claims and Disputes Between the Contractor
and the Owner
2.2.6 through 2.2.12, 7.10
Claims for Additional Cost or Time
8.3.2, 8.3.3, 12.1.6,
12.1.7,12.2
Claims for Damages
7.4, 8.3
Claims of the Subcontractor
5.3.1.4
Cleaning up
4.16, 6.4
Codes
4.7.2, 10.2.2
Commencement of the Work
7 3 . 1 , 8.1.2
Communications
2.2.2, 3.2.4, 4.9.1, 4.17
COMPLETION, PAYMENTS A N D
9
Completion, Substantial
2.2.15, 8.13, 8.2.3, 9.7
Contract, Definition of
1.1.2
Contract Bonds
7.5
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
1
Contract Documents, Copies Furnished and
Ownership of
1.3
Contract Documents, Definition of
1.1.1
Contract Documents, Execution, Correlation,
Intent and Interpretations
1.2
Contract Modifications
1.1.1, 1.2J, 12
Contract Sum, Changes of
12.1, 12.2
Contract Sum, Definition of
9.1.1
Contract Termination by Contractor
14.1
Contract Termination by Owner
14.2
Contract Time
8.1.1

Contracts. Separate
CONTRACTOR
Contractor, Definition of
Contractor, Stopping the Work by the
Contractor, Termination of the Contract by the
Contractor's Liability Insurance
Contractor's Relations with Subcontractors
Contractor's Responsibility for Protection
and Safety
Contractor's Responsibility for Those
Performing the Work
Contractor's Review of Contract Documents
Contractor's Superintendent
Contractor's Supervision and Construction
Procedures
Contractors, Mutual Responsibility of
Copies Furnished of Drawings and Specifications
Correction of Work
Cutting and Patching of Work
Cutting and Patching Under Separate Contracts

6.1
4
4.1
9.6.1
14.1
11.1
1.2.4, 5.3
10.1, 10.2
4.10
1.2.2, 4.2
4.9.1, 10.2-5
4.3
6.2
1.3.1
13.2
4.15
S3

Damages, Claims for
Damages for Delay
Day, Definition of
Debris Removal
Deductions tor Uncorrected Work
Defective or Non-Conforming Work,
Acceptance of
Delays and Extensions of Time
Documents, Execution of the Contract
Drawings and Specifications at the Site
Drawings and Specifications, Ownership of
Drawings, Arrangement of
Drawings as Written Interpretations

7.4, 8.3
8.3.4
8.1.4
4.16, 6.4
13.3.1
133
S3
1.2.1
4.12
133
1.2-4
1.23

Easements
Emergencies
Execution, Correlation, Intent and Interpretations
of the Contract Documents
Extensions of Time
Extras
Failure of Payment
Field Orders
Final Payment
Fire, Extended Coverage, Vandalism and
Malicious Mischief Insurance
Governing Law
Guarantee Bonds
Guarantee

3.2-2
10J
1.2
8 J , 12.1
12

133,

3-4
12-3, 1ZA
5-7
11.3.1

933,

7.1
73
1233

Indemnification
4.18
Information and Services Required of the Owner
3-2
Inspections
2^.15, 7 J , 9.7
Instructions to the Contractor
2-2-2, 3.2.4
INSURANCE
11
Insurance, Builders Risk (Sec Property
Insurance)
11 J . I
Insurance, Contractor's Liability
11.1
Insurance, Fire, Extended Coverage
Vandalism, and Malicious U I M hi«*r
11.3.1
Insurance, Loss of Use
11.4
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Insurance, Owner's Liability
Insurance, Property
.....
Insurance, Special Hazards
..
Insurance, Steam Boiler and Machinery
Interest
Interpretations and Decisions
of the Architect
Interpretations, Written

..
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A34

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION

ARTICLE 1
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
1.1

DEFINITIONS

1.1.1

THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS

The Contract Documents consist of the Agreement, the
Conditions of the Contract (Ceneral, Supplementary and
other Conditions), the Drawings, the Specifications, all
Addenda issued prior to execution of the Contract, and
ail Modifications thereto. A Modification is (1) a written
amendment to the Contract signed by both parties, (2)
a Change Order. <3) a written interpretation issued by
the Architect pursuant to Subparagraph 1.2.5, or (4) a
written order for a minor change in the Work issued by
the Architect pursuant to Paragraph 12.3. A Modification
may be made only after execution of the Contract.
1.1.2

THE CONTRACT

The Contract Documents form the Contract. The Contract
represents the entire and integrated agreement between
the parties hereto and supersedes all prior negotiations,
representations, or agreements, either written or oral,
including the bidding documents. The Contract may be
amended or modified only by a Modification as defined
in Subparagraph 1.1.1.
1.1.3

THE WORK

The term Work includes all labor necessary to produce
the construction required by the Contract Documents,
and all materials dnti equipment incorporated or to be
incorporated in sucn construction.
1.1.4

THE PROJECT

The Project is the total construction designed by the
Architect of which the Work performed under the Contract Documents may be the whole or a part.
1.2

as provided in Subparagraph 4.4.1 necessary for the
proper execution and completion of the Work. It is not
intended that W o r k not covered under any heading,
section, branch, class or trade of the Specifications shall
be supplied unless it is required elsewhere in the Contract
Documents or is reasonably inferable therefrom as being
necessary to produce the intended results. Words which
have well-known technical or trade meanings are used
herein in accordance with such recognized meanings.
1.2.4 The organization of the Specifications into divisions, sections and articles, and the arrangement of
Drawings shall not control the Contractor in dividing
the Work among Subcontractors or in establishing the
extent of Work to be performed by any trade.
1.2.5 Written interpretations necessary for the proper
execution or progress of the Work, in the form of drawings or otherwise, will be issued with reasonable promptness by the Architect and in accordance w i t h any
schedule agreed upon. Either party to the Contract may
make written request to the Architect for such interpretations. Such interpretations shall be consistent with
and reasonably inferable from the Contract Documents,
and may be effected by Field Order.
1.3

COPIES FURNISHED AND OWNERSHIP

1.3.1 Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents, the Contractor will be furnished, free of charge,
ail copies of Drawings and Specifications reasonably necessary for the execution of the Work.
1.3.2 All Drawings, Specifications and copies thereof
furnished by the Architect are and shall remain his property. They are not to be used on any other project, and,
w i t h the exception of one contract set for each party to
the Contract, are to be returned to the Architect on request at the completion of the Work.
ARTICLE 2

EXECUTION, CORRELATION, INTENT AND
INTERPRETATIONS

1.2.1 The Contract Documents shall be signed in not less
than triplicate by the Owner and Contractor. If either the
O w n e r or the Contractor or both do not sign the Conditions of the Contract, Drawings. Specifications, or any
of the other Contract Documents, the Architect shall
identify them.
1.2.2 By executing the Contract, the Contractor represents
that he has visited the site, familiarized himself with the
local conditions under which the Work is to be performed, and correlated his observations with the requirements of the Contract Documents.
1.2.3 The Contract Documents are complementary, and
what is required by anv one shall be as binding as if
required by all. Tho intention of the Documents is to
include all labor Tv.\-t.\,. • jmnment and other items

ARCHITECT
2.1

DEFINITION

2.1.1 The Architect is the person or organization licensed
to practice architecture and identified as such in the
Agreement and is referred to throughout the Contract
Documents as if singular in number and masculine in
gender. The term Architect means the Architect or his
authorized representative.
2.1.2 Nothing contained in the Contract Documents shall
create any contractual relationship between the Architect
and the Contractor.
2.2

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT

2.2.1 The Architect will provide general Administration
of the Construction Contract, including performance of
the functions hereinafter described.
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2.2.2 The Architect w i l l be the Owner s representative
during construction and until final payment. The Architect
w i l l have authority to act on behalf of the Owner to the
extent provided in the Contract Documents, unless otherwise m o d i f i e d by written instrument which will be shown
to the Contractor. The Architect w i l l advise and consult
w i t h the O w n e r , and all of the Owner's instructions to
the Contractor shall be issued through the Architect.
2.2.3 The Architect shall at all times
W o r k wherever it is in preparation
Contractor shall provide facilities for
Architect may perform his functions
Documents.

have access to the
and progress. The
such access so the
under the Contract

2.2.4 The Architect will make periodic visits to the site
to familiarize himself generally w i t h the progress and
quality of the W o r k and to determine in general if the
W o r k is proceeding in accordance w i t h the Contract
Documents. O n the basis of his on-site observations as
an architect, he w i l l keep the O w n e r informed of the
progress of the W o r k , and w i l l endeavor to guard t
O w n e r against defects and deficiencies in the Work of t
Contractor. The Architect w i l l not be required to ma
exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections to check tl
quality or quantity of the W o r k . The Architect w i l l not I
responsible for construction means, methods, technique
sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions ar
programs in connection w i t h the W o r k , and he will n<
be responsible for the Contractor's failure to carry oi
the W o r k in accordance w i t h the Contract Documents.
2.2.5 Based on such observations and the Contractor
Applications for Payment, the Architect w i l l determin
the amounts o w i n g to the Contractor and w i l l issu
Certificates for Payment in such amounts, as provider
in Paragraph 9.4.
2.2.6 The Architect will be, in the first instance, the
interpreter of the requirements of the Contract Documents and the judge of the performance thereunder by
both the O w n e r and Contractor. The Architect w i l l ,
w i t h i n a reasonable time, render such interpretations as
he may deem necessary for the proper execution or progress of the W o r k .
2.2.7 Claims, disputes and other matters in question
between the Contractor and the Owner relating to the
execution or progress of the W o r k or the interpretation
of the Contract Documents shall be referred initially to
the Architect for decision w h i c h he will render in writing
w i t h i n a reasonable time.

w h i c h have been waived by the making or acceptance
of final payment as provided in Subparagraphs 9.7.5 and
9.7.6, shall be subject to arbitration upon the written
demand of either party. However, no demand for arbitration of any such claim, dispute or other matter may be
made until the earlier of:
2.2.10.1 The date on which the Architect has rendered
his written decision, or
.2 the tenth day after the parties have presented
their evidence to the Architect or have been
given a reasonable opportunity to do so, if the
Architect has not rendered his written decision
by that date.
2.2.11 If a decision of the Architect is made in writing
and states that it is final but subject to appeal, no demand
for arbitration of a claim, dispute or other matter covered
by such decision may be made later than thirty days after
the date on which the party making the demand received
the decision. Thf» failure to demand arbitration w i t h i n
riod w i l l result in the Architect's decil and binding upon the Owner and the
vrchitect renders a decision after arbi; have been initiated, such decision
evidence but will not supersede any
ngs unless the decision is acceptable

srned.
: t w i l l have authority to reject W o r k
inform to the Contract Documents,
reasonable opinion, he considers it
)le to insure the proper implementa3f the Contract Documents, he will
quire special inspection or testing of
.
nee with Subparagraph 7.8.2 whether
or not such Work be then fabricated, installed or completed. However, neither the Architect's authority to act
under this Subparagraph 2.2.12, nor any decision made
by him in good faith either to exercise or not to exercise
such authority, shall give rise to any duty or responsibility
of the Architect to the Contractor, any Subcontractor,
any of their agents or employees, or any other person
performing any of the Work.
2.2.13 The Architect will review Shop Drawings and
Samples as provided in Subparagraphs 4.13.1 through
4.13.8 inclusive.
2.2.14 The Architect will prepare Change Orders in accordance w i t h Article 12, and will have authority to order
minor changes in the Work as provided in Subparagraph
U.3.1.

2.2.8 All interpretations and decisions of the Architect
shall be consistent w i t h the intent of the Contract Documents. In his capacity as interpreter and judge, he w i l l
exercise his best efforts to insure faithful performance by
both the O w n e r and the Contractor and w i l l not show
partiality to either.

2.2.15 The Architect will conduct inspections to determine the dates of Substantial Completion and final comp l e t i o n , w i l l receive and review written guarantees and
related documents required by the Contract and assembled
by the Contractor and w i l l issue a final Certificate for
Payment.

2.2.9 The Architect's decisions in matters relating to
artistic effect w i l l be final if consistent with the intent of
the Contract Documents.

2.2.16 If the Owner and Architect agree, the Architect
w i l l provide one or more Full-Time Project Representatives
to assist the Architect in carrying out his responsibilities
at the site. The duties, responsibilities and limitations of
authority of any such Project Representative shall be as
set forth in an exhibit to be incorporated in the Contract
Documents.

2.2.10 Any claim, dispute or other matter that has been
referred to the Architect, except those relating to artistic
effect as provided in Subparagraph 2.2.9 and except any

6

A1A DOCUMENT A201 • C E N T A L CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION • TWELFTH EDITION • APRIL 1970 ED.
AIA« • <£> 1970 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS. 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D C 20006

2.2.17 The duties, responsibilities and limitations of
authority of the Architect as the Owner's representative
during construction as set forth in Articles 1 through 14
inclusive of these General Conditions will not be modified or extended without written consent of the Owner,
the Contractor and the Architect.
2.2.18 The Architect will not be responsible for the acts
or omissions of the Contractor, any Subcontractors, or
any of their agents or employees, or any other persons
performing any of the Work.
2.2.19 In case of the termination of the employment of
the Architect, the Owner shall appoint an architect
against whom the Contractor makes no reasonable objection whose status under the Contract Documents shall
be that of the former architect. Any dispute in connection with such appointment shall be subject to arbitration.
ARTICLE 3
OWNER
3.1

DEFINITION

3.1.1 The Owner is the person or organization identified
as such in the Agreement and is referred to throughout
the Contract Documents as if singular in number and
masculine in gender. The term Owner means the Owner
or his authorized representative.
3.2

INFORMATION AND SERVICES REQUIRED
OF THE OWNER

3.2.1 The Owner shall furnish ail surveys describing the
physical characteristics, legal limits and utility locations
for the site of the Project.
3.2.2 The Owner shall secure and pay for easements for
permanent structures or permanent changes in existing
facilities.
3.2.3 Information or ?ervices under the Owner's control
shall be furnished bv tht- Owner with reasonable promptness to avoid delay m the orderly progress of the Work.

may have, make good such deficiencies. In such case an
appropriate Change Order shall be issued deducting from
the payments then or thereafter due the Contractor the
cost of correcting such deficiencies, including the cost
of the Architect's additional services made necessary by
such default, neglect or failure. The Architect must approve both such action and the amount charged to the
Contractor. If the payments then or thereafter due the
Contractor are not sufficient to cover such amount, the
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner.
ARTICLE 4
CONTRACTOR
4.1
DEFINITION
4.1.1 The Contractor is the person or organization identified as such in the Agreement and is referred to throughout the Contract Documents as if singular in number and
masculine in gender. The term Contractor means the
Contractor or his authorized representative.
4.2

REVIEW OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS

4.2.1 The Contractor shall carefully study and compare
the Contract Documents and shall at once report to the
Architect any error, inconsistency or omission he may
discover. The Contractor shall not be liable to the Owner
or the Architect for any damage resulting from any such
errors, inconsistencies or omissions in the Contract Documents. The Contractor shall do no Work without Drawings, Specifications or Modifications.
4.3

SUPERVISION AND CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES

4.3.1 The Contractor shall supervise and direct the Work,
using his best skill and attention. He shall be solely responsible for all construction means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures and for coordinating
ail portions of the Work under the Contract.
4.4

LABOR AND MATERIALS

3.2.4 The Owner shall «we all instructions to the Contractor through the Arcnirect.

4.4.1 Unless otherwise specifically noted, the Contractor
shall provide and pay for all labor, materials, equipment,
tools, construction equipment and machinery, water, heat,
utilities, transportation, and other facilities and services
necessary for the proper execution and completion' of
the Work.

3.2.5 The foregoing ire m addition to other duties and
responsibilities of the Owner enumerated herein and
especially those in respect to Payment and Insurance in
Articles 9 and 11 respof_;.\.--..

4.4.2 The Contractor shall at ail times enforce strict discipline and good order among his employees and shall
not employ on the Work any unfit person or anyone not
skilled in the task assigned to him.

3.3

4.5

OWNER'S RIGHT TO STOP THE WORK

3.3.1 If the Contractor fails to correct defective Work
or persistently rails to supply materials or equipment in
accordance with the Contract Documents, the Owner
may order the C o n t r a c t io btop the Work, or any portion thereof, untii t'.e VJSC for such order has been
eliminated.
3.4

OWNER'S RIGHT TO C \RRY OUT THE WORK

3.4.1 If the Contrac •
. nts or neglects to carry out
the Work in accorr. a •••••• : .h the Contract Documents
or fails to perform ..'"•
• \i<»on of the Contract, the
Owner may, after ^e • •
•-.- written notice to the Contractor and withour .. • • jc:ce to any other remedy he
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WARRANTY

4.5.1 The Contractor warrants to the Owner and the
Architect that all materials and equipment furnished under this Contract will be new unless otherwise specified,
and that all Work will be of good quality, hee from faults
and defects and in conformance with the Contract Documents. All Work not so conforming to these standards
may be considered defective. If required by the Architect, the Contractor shall furnish satisfactory evidence
as to the kind and quality of materials and equipment.
4.6

TAXES

4.6.1 The Contractor shall pay all sales, consumer, use
and other similar taxes required by law.
STRUCTION • TWELFTH EDITION • APRIL 1970 ED.

4.7

PERMITS, FEES AND NOTICES

4.7.1 The Contractor shall secure and pay for all permits,
governmental fees and licenses necessary for the proper
execution and completion of the Work, which are applicable at the time the bids are received. It is not the responsibility of the Contractor to make certain that the
Drawings and Specifications are in accordance with applicable laws, statutes, building codes and regulations.
4.7.2 The Contractor shall give all notices and comply
with ail laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and orders
of any public authority bearing on the performance of
the Work If the Contractor observes that any of the
Contract Documents are at variance therewith in any
respect, he shall promptly notify the Architect in writing,
and any necessary changes shall be adjusted by appropriate Modification If the Contractor performs any Work
knowing it to be contrary to such laws, ordinances, rules
and regulations, and without such notice to the Architect, he shall assume full responsibility therefor and shall
bear all costs attributable thereto
4.8

SUPERINTENDENT

4.9.1 The Contractor shall employ a competent superintendent and necessary assistants who shall be in attendance at the Project site during the progress of the
Work The superintendent shall be satisfactory to the
Architect, and shall not be changed except with the consent of the Architect, unless the superintendent proves
to be unsatisfactory to the Contractor and ceases to be
in his employ The superintendent shall represent the
Contractor and all communications given to the superintendent shall be as binding as if given to the Contractor
Important communications will be confirmed in writing
Other communications will be so confirmed on written
request in each case
4.10

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE PERFORMING
THE WORK

4.10.1 The Contractor shall
for the acts and omissions
Subcontractors, their agents
persons performing any of
with the Contractor

8

be responsible to the Owner
of all his employees and all
and employees, and all other
the Work under a contract
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PROGRESS SCHEDULE

4.11.1 The Contractor, immediately after being awarded
the Contract, shall prepare and submit for the Architect's
approva\ an estimated progress schedule for the Work
The progress schedule shall be related to the entire Project to the extent required by the Contract Documents
This schedule shall indicate the dates for the starting and
completion of the various stages of construction and
shall be revised as required by the conditions of the
Work, subject to the Architect's approval
4.12

DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS AT THE SITE

4.12.1 The Contractor shall maintain at the site for the
Owner one copv of all Drawings, Specifications, Addenda,
approved Shop Drawings, Change Orders and other Modifications, in good order and marked to record all changes
made during construction These shall be available to the
Architect The Drawings, marked to record all changes
made during construction, shall be delivered to him for
the Owner upon completion of the Work
4.13

CASH ALLOWANCES

4.8.1 The Contractor shall include in the Contract Sum
ail allowances stated m the Contract Documents These
allowances shall cover the net cost of the materials and
equipment delivered and unloaded at the site, and all
applicable taxes The Contractor's handling costs on the
site, labor, installation costs, overhead, profit and other
expenses contemplated for the original allowance shall
be included in the Contract Sum and not in the allowance The Contractor shall cause the Work covered by
these allowances to be performed for such amounts and
by such persons as the Architect may direct, but he will
not be required to employ persons agamst whom he
makes a reasonable objection If the cost, when determined, is more than or less than the allowance, the Contract Sum shall be adjusted accordingly by Change Order
which will include additional handling costs on the site,
labor, installation costs, overhead, profit and other expenses resulting to the Contractor from any increase over
the original allowance
4.9

4.11

SHOP DRAWINGS AND SAMPLES

4.13.1 Shop Drawings are drawings, diagrams, illustrations, schedules, performance charts, brochures and other
data which are prepared by the Contractor or any Subcontractor, manufacturer, supplier or distributor, and
which illustrate some portion of the Work.
4.13.2 Samples are physical examples furnished by the
Contractor to illustrate materials, equipment or workmanship, and to establish standards by which the Work
will be judged.
4.13.3 The Contractor shall review, stamp with his approval and submit, with reasonable promptness and in
orderly sequence so as to cause no delay in the Work
or in the work of any other contractor, ail Shop Drawings and Samples required by the Contract Documents
or subsequently by the Architect as covered by Modifications Shop Drawings and Samples snail be properly
identified as specified, or as the Architect may require
At the time of submission the Contractor shall mrorm the
Architect in writing of any deviation in the Shop Drawings or Samples from the requirements of the Contract
Documents
4.13.4 By appiovmg and submitting Shop Drawings and
Samples, the Contractor thereby represents that he has
determined and verified all field measurements, field construction enter a, materials, catalog numbers and similar
data, or will do so, and that he has checked and coordinated each Shop Drawing and Sample with the requirements of the Work and of the Contract Documents
4.13.5 The Aichitect will review and approve Shop
Drawings and Samples with reasonable promptness so as
to ran*;* nn riolav hut 0 nly for conformance with the deject and with the information given
ents The Architect's approval of a
indicate approval of an assembly
ions
shall
t and
zopies
J The

make any corrections reshall resubmit the required
of Shop Drawings or new
Contractor shall direct spe-
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cific attention in writing or on resubmitted Shop Drawings to revisions other than the corrections requested by
the Architect on previous submissions
4.13.7 The Architect's approval of Shop Drawings or
Samples shall not relieve the Contractor of responsibility
for any deviation from the requirements of the Contract
Documents unless the Contractor has informed the Architect in writing of such deviation at the time of submission and the Architect has given written approval to the
specific deviation, nor shall the Architect's approval relieve the Contractor from responsibility for errors or
omissions in the Shop Drawings or Samples.
4.13.8 No portion of the W o r k requiring a Shop Drawing
or Sample submission shall be commenced until the
submission has been approved by the Architect All such
portions of the Work shall be in accordance with approved Shop Drawings and Samples
4.14

USE OF SITE

4.14.1 The Contractor shall confine operations at the
site to areas permitted by law, ordinances, permits and
the Contract Documents and shall not unreasonablv encumber the site with any materials or equipment
4.15

CLEANING UP

4.16.1 The Contractor at all times shall keep the premises free from accumulation of waste materials or rubbish
caused bv his operations At the completion of the Work
he shall remove all his waste materials and rubbish from
and about the Project as well as all his tools, construction equipment, machinery and surplus materials, and
shall clean ail glass surfaces and leave the Work " b r o o m clean" or its equivalent, except as otherwise specified
4.16.2 If the Contractor fails to clean up, the Owner
may do so and the cost thereof shall be charged to the
Contractor as provided in Paragraph 3 4
4.17

COMMUNICATIONS

4.17.1 The Contractor shall forward all communications
to the Owner through the Architect.
4.18

4.18.2 In any and all claims against the Owner or the
Architect or any of their agents or employees by any e m ployee oi the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone d i rectly or indirectly employed by any of them or anyone
for whose acts any of them may be liable, the indemnification obligation under this Paragraph 4 18 shall not be
limited in any way by any limitation on the amount or
type of damages, compensation or benefits payable bv
or for the Contractor or any Subcontractor under workmen's compensation acts, disability benefit acts or other
employee benefit acts.
4.18.3 The obligations of the Contractor under this Paragraph 4 18 shall not extend to the liability of the Architect, his agents or employees arising out of (1) the preparation or approval oi maps, drawings, opinions, reports,
survevs, Change Orders, designs or specifications, or (2j
the giving of or the failure to give directions or instructions by the Architect, his agents or employees provided
such giving or failure to give is the primary cause of the
injury or damage

ARTICLE 5

CUTTING AND PATCHING OF WORK

4.15.1 The Contractor shall do all cutting, fitting or
patching of his Work that may be required to make its
several parts fit together properly, and shall not endanger
any W o r k by cutting, excavating or otherwise altering the
W o r k or any part of it.
4.16

regardless of whether or not it is caused in part by a
party indemnified hereunder

INDEMNIFICATION

4.18.1 The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless
the Owner and the Architect and their agents and e m ployees from and against all claims, damages, losses and
expenses including attorneys' fees arising out of or resulting from the performance of the W o r k , provided that
any such claim, damage, loss or expense (1) is attributable
to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury
to or destruction of tangible property (other than the
W o r k itself) including the loss of use resulting theref r o m , and (2) is caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by any of
them or anvone for whose acts any of them may be liable,

SUBCONTRACTORS
5.1

DEFINITION

5.1.1 A Subcontractor is a person or organization w h o
has a direct contract w i t h the Contractor to perform any
of the Work at the site. The term Subcontractor is referred to throughout the Contract Documents as if singular in number and masculine in gender and means a
Subcontractor or his authorized representative.
5.1.2 A Sub-subcontractor is a person or organization
who has a direct or indirect contract with a Subcontractor
to perform any of the W o r k at the site. The term Subsubcontractor is referred to throughout the Contract
Documents as if singular in number and masculine in
gender and means a Sub-subcontractor or an authorized
representative thereof
5.1.3 Nothing contained in the Contract Documents
shall create any contractual relation between the Owner
or the Architect and any Subcontractor or Sub-subcontractor.
5.2

AWARD OF SUBCONTRACTS AND OTHER
CONTRACTS FOR PORTIONS OF THE WORK

5.2.1 Unless otherwise specified in the Contract Documents or in the Instructions to Bidders, the Contractor,
as soon as practicable after the award of the Contract,
shall furnish to the Architect in writing for acceptance by
the Owner and the Architect a list of the names of the
Subcontractors proposed for the principal portions of the
Work. The Architect shall promptly notify the Contractor in writing if either the O w n e r or the Architect, after
due investigation, has reasonable objection to any Subcontractor on such list and does not accept him Failure
of the Owner or Architect to make objection promptly to
any Subcontractor on the list shall constitute acceptance
of such Subcontractor
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5.2.2 The Contractor shall not contract w i t h any Subcontractor or am person or organization (including
those
w h o are to furnish materials or equipment fabricated to
a special design) proposed for portions of the W o r k
designated in the Contract Documents or in the Instructions to Bidders or, if none is so designated, w i t h an>
Subcontractor proposed for the principal portions of the
W o r k w h o has been rejected by the O w n e r and the
Architect The Contractor w i l l not be required to c o n tract w i t h any Subcontractor or person or organization
against w h o m he has a reasonable objection
5.2.3 If the O w n e r or Architect refuses to accept any
Subcontractor or person or organization on a list subm i t t e d by the Contractor in response to the requirements
of the Contract Documents or the Instructions to Bidders,
the Contractor shall submit an acceptable substitute and
the Contract Sum shad be increased or decreased by the
difference in cost occasioned by such substitution and an
appropriate Change Order shall be issued, however, no
increase in the Contract Sum shall be allowed for any
such substitution unless the Contractor has acted promptly
and responsively in submitting for acceptance any list
or lists of names as required by the Contract Documents
or the Instructions to Bidders.
5.2.4 If the O w n e r or the Architect requires a change of
any proposed Subcontractor or person or organization
previously accepted by t h e m , the Contract Sum shall be
increased or decreased by the difference in cost occasioned by such change and an appropriate Change Order
shall be issued
5.2.5 The Contractor shall not
any Subcontractor or person
been accepted by the O w n e r
the substitution is acceptable
Architect.
5.3

make any substitution for
or organization w h o has
and the Architect, unless
to the Owner and the

SUBCONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

5.3.1 A l l work performed for the Contractor by a Subcontractor shall be pursuant to an appropriate agreement between the Contractor and the Subcontractor (and
where appropriate between Subcontractors and Subsubcontractors) w h i c h shall contain provisions that*
. 1 preserve and protect the rights of the Owner and
the Architect under the Contract w i t h respect to
the W o r k to be performed under the subcontract
so that the subcontracting thereof will not prejudice such rights,
.2 require that such W o r k be performed in accordance w i t h the requirements of the Contract
Documents,
.3 require submission to the Contractor of applications for payment under each subcontract to
w h i c h the Contractor is a party, in reasonable
time to enable the Contractor to apply for payment in accordance w i t h Article 9,
4 require that all claims for additional costs, extensions of time, damages for delays or otherwise
w i t h respect to subcontracted portions of the
Work shall be submitted
to the Contractor (via
any Subcontractor or Sub-subcontractor where
appropriate) in sufficient time so that the Con-
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tractor may ccmtnlv r •- j manner provided in
the Contract D o c L - n i n t
or uke claims by the
Contractor upon tn*» Ov\n«r
.5 waive all rights the contracting parties may have
against one another rer damages caused by fire
or other perils covered b\ the property insurance
described in Paragraph *M 3 except such rights as
they may have to the proceeds of such insurance
held by the O w n e r as trustee under Paragraph
11 3, and
6 obligate each Subcontractor specifically to consent to the provision^ or this Paragraph 5.3
5.4

PAYMENTS TO SUBCONTRACTORS

5.4.1 The Contractor shall pay each Subcontractor, upon
receipt of payment from the Owner an amount equal
to the percentage ot completion allowed to the Contractor on account of such Subcontractor's Work, less the
percentage retained from pavments to the Contractor
The Contractor shall also require each Subcontractor to
make similar payments to his subcontractors.
5.4.2 If the Architect fails to issue a Certificate for Payment for any cause which is the fault of the Contractor
and not the fault of a particular Subcontractor, the Contractor shall pay that Subcontractor on demand, made at
any time after the Certificate for Payment should otherwise have been issued, for hi> Work to the extent c o m pleted, less the retained percentage
5.4.3 The Contractor shall pay each Subcontractor a just
share of any insurance moness received by the Contractor
under Article 11, and he shall require each Subcontractor
to make similar payments to his subcontractors.
5.4.4 The Architect may, on request and at his discretion,
furnish to any Subcontractor, if practicable, information
regarding percentages of comp'enun certified to the Contractor on account of Work done bv such Subcontractors
5.4.5 Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall have any
obligation to pay or to see to the pavment of any moneys
to any Subcontractor except as may otherwise be required
by law
ARTICLE 6

6.1

SEPARATE C O N T R A C T S
OWNER'S RICHT TO AWARD SEPARATE CONTRACTS

6.1.1 The Owner reserves the nght to award other contracts in connection w i t h other portions of the Project
under these or similar Conditions of the Contract.
6.1.2 When separate contracts are awarded for different
portions of the Project, " t h e Contractor" m the contract
documents in each case shall bo the contractor w h o signs
each separate contract
6.2

MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTRACTORS

6.2.1 The Contractor shall afiord other contractors reasonable oppoitunity for the introduction and storage of
their materials and equipment a: ri tne execution of their
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work, and shall properly connect and coordinate
W o r k with theirs

his

6.2.2 If any part of the Contractor's Work depends for
proper execution or results upon the work of anv other
separate contractor, the Contractor shall inspect and
promptly report to the Architect any apparent discrepancies or defects in such work that render it unsuitable for
such proper execution and results. Failure of the Contractor so to inspect and report shall constitute an acceptance of the other contractor's work as fit and proper to
receive his Work, except as to defects which may develop
in the other separate contractor's work after the execution
of the Contractor's Work.
6.2.3 Should the Contractor cause damage to the work
or property of anv separate contractor on the Project, the
Contractor shall, upon due notice, settle with such other
contractor by agreement or arbitration, if he will so settle.
If such separate contractor sues the Owner or initiates
an arbitration proceeding on account of any damage
alleged to have been so sustained, the Owner shall notify
the Contractor w h o shall defend such proceedings at the
Owner's expense, and if any judgment or award against
the Owner arises therefrom the Contractor shall pay or
satisfy it and shall reimburse the Owner for ail attorneys'
fees and court or arbitration costs which the O w n e r has
incurred.
6.3

CUTTING AND PATCHING
UNDER SEPARATE CONTRACTS

6.3.1 The Contractor shall be responsible for any cutting,
fitting and patching that may be required to complete
his Work except as otherwise specifically provided in the
Contract Documents. The Contractor shall not endanger
any work of any other contractors by cutting, excavating
or otherwise altering any work and shall not cut or alter
the work of any other contractor except with the written
consent of the Architect.
6.3.2 Any costs caused by defective or ill-timed work
shall be borne by the party responsible therefor.
6#4

OWNER'S RIGHT TO CLEAN UP

6.4.1 If a dispute arises between the separate contractors
as to their responsibility for cleaning up as required by
Paragraph 4.16, the Owner may clean up and charge the
cost thereof to the several contractors as the Architect
shall determine to be just.
ARTICLE 7
MISCELLANEOUS
7.1

PROVISIONS

GOVERNING LAW

7.1.1 The Contract shall be governed by the law of the
place where the Project is located.
7.2

SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS

7.2.1 The Owner and the Contractor each binds h i m self, his partners, successors, assigns and legal representatives to the other party hereto and to the partners, successors, assigns and legal representatives of such other
party in respect to all covenants, agreements and obligations contained in the Contract Documents. Neither

party to the Contract shall assign the Contract or sublet it
as a whole without the written consent of the other, nor
shall the Contractor assign any moneys due or to become
due to him hereunder, w i t h o u t the previous written consent of the Owner
7.3

WRITTEN NOTICE

7.3.1 Written notice shall be deemed to have been duly
served if delivered in person to the individual or member
of the firm or to an officer of the corporation for w h o m
it was intended, or if delivered at or sent by registered
or certified mail to the last business address known to
him w h o gives the notice.
7.4

CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES

7.4.1 Should either party to the Contract suffer injury or
damage to person or property because or any act or
omission of the other party or of any of his employees,
agents or others for whose acts he is legally liable, claim
shall be made in writing to such other party within a
reasonable time after the first observance of such injury
or damage.
7.5

PERFORMANCE BOND AND
LABOR AND MATERIAL PAYMENT BOND

7.5.1 The Owner shall have the right to require the
Contractor to furnish bonds covering the faithful performance of the Contract and the payment of all obligations arising thereunder if and as required in the Instructions to Bidders or elsewhere in the Contract Documents
7.6

RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

7.6.1 The duties and obligations imposed by
tract Documents and the rights and remedies
thereunder shall be in addition to and not a
of any duties, obligations, rights and remedies
imposed or available by law
7.7

the Conavailable
limitation
otherwise

ROYALTIES AND PATENTS

7.7.1 The Contractor shall pay all royalties and license
fees. He shall defend all suits or claims for infringement
of any patent rights and shall save the Owner harmless
from loss on account thereof, except that the Owner
shall be responsible for ail such loss when a particular design, process or the product of a particular manufacturer
or manufacturers is specified, but if the Contractor has
reason to believe that the design, process or product
specified is an infringement of a patent, he shall be responsible for such loss unless he promptly gives such information to the Architect.
7.8

TESTS

7.8.1 If the Contract Documents, laws, ordinances, rules,
regulations or orders of any public authority having jurisdiction require any W o r k to be inspected, tested or approved, the Contractor shall give the Architect timely notice of its readiness and of the date arranged so the
Architect may observe such inspection, testing or approval. The Contractor shall bear ail costs of such inspections, tests and approvals unless otherwise provided.
7.8.2 If after the commencement of the Work the
Architect determines that any Work requires special inspection, testing, or approval which Subparagraph 7 8 1
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does not include, he w i l l , upon written authorization
from the O w n e r , instruct the Contractor to order such
special inspection, testing or approval, and the Contractor shall give notice as in Subparagraph 7 8 1 If such
special inspection or testing reveals a failure of the Work
to comply (1) w i t h the requirements of the Contract
Documents or (2), w i t h respect to the performance of the
W o r k , w i t h laws, ordinances, rules, regulations or orders
of any public authority having jurisdiction, the Contractor
shall bear all costs thereof, including the Architect's additional services made necessary by such failure, otherwise
the O w n e r shall bear such costs, and an appropriate
Change Order shall be issued.
7.8.3 Required certificates of inspection, testing or approval shall be secured by the Contractor and promptly
delivered by him to the Architect
7.8.4 If the Architect wishes to observe the inspections,
tests or approvals required by this Paragraph 7 8, he w i l l
do so promptly and, where practicable, at the source of
supply.
7.8.5 Neither the observations of the Architect in his
Administration of the Construction Contract, nor inspections, tests or approvals by persons other than the Contractor shall relieve the Contractor from his obligations
to perform the Work in accordance with the Contract
Documents.
7.9

TIME
8.1

DEFINITIONS

8.1.1 The Contract Time is the period of time alloted in
the Contract Documents for completion of the Work.
8.1.2 The date of commencement of the Work is the
date established in a notice to proceed If there is no
notice to proceed, it shall be the date of the Agreement
or such other date as may be established therein
8.1.3 The Date of Substantial Completion of the W o r k
or designated portion thereof is the Date certified by the
Architect when construction is sufficiently complete, in
accordance with the Contract Documents, so the Owner
may occupy the W o r k or designated portion thereof for
the use for which it is intended.
8.1.4 The term day as used in the Contract Documents
shall mean calendar day.
8.2

PROGRESS AND COMPLETION

8.2.2 The Contractor shall begin the Work on the date
of commencement as defined in Subparagraph 8 1 2 He
shall carry the W o r k forward expeditiously with adequate
forces and shall complete it within the Contract Time.

ARBITRATION

7.10.1 A l l claims, disputes and other matters in question
arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach
thereof, except as set forth in Subparagraph 2.2 9 with
respect to the Architect's decisions on matters relating
to artistic effect, and except for claims which have been
waived by the making or acceptance of final payment as
provided by Subparagraphs 9 7 5 and 9 7 6, shall be decided by arbitration in accordance w i t h the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually
agree otherwise This agreement to arbitrate shall be
specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration
law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final,
and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance w i t h
applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
7.10.2 Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed
in w r i t i n g w i t h the other party to the Contract and w i t h
the American Arbitration Association, and a copy shall
be filed with the A r c h i t e c t The demand for arbitration
shall be made w i t h i n the time limits specified in Subparagraphs 2 2 1 0 and 2.2.11 where applicable, and in
ail other cases w i t h i n a reasonable time after the claim,
dispute or other matter in question has arisen, and in no
event shall it be made after the date when institution of
legal or equitable proceedings based on such claim,
dispute or other matter in question w o u l d be barred by
the applicable statute of limitations
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ARTICLE 8

8.2.1 All time limits stated in the Contract Documents
are of the essence of the Contract

INTEREST

7.9.1 Any moneys not paid when due to either party
under this Contract shall bear interest at the legal rate in
force at the place of the Project.
7.-J0

7.10.3 The Contractor shall carry on the Work and maintain the progress schedule during any arbitration proceedings, unless otherwise agreed by him and the Owner
in writing.

8.2.3 If a date or time of completion is included in the
Contract, it shall be the Date of Substantial Completion
as defined in Subparagraph 8.1.3, including authorized
extensions thereto, unless otherwise provided.
DELAYS AND EXTENSIONS OF TIME
8.3
8.3.1 If the Contractor is delayed at any time in the
progress of the Work by any act or neglect of the Owner
or the Architect, or by any employee of either, or by any
separate contractor employed by the Owner, or by
changes ordered in the Work, or by labor disputes, fire,
unusual delay in transportation, unavoidable casualties or
any causes beyond the Contractor's control, or by delav
authorized by the O w n e r pending arbitration, or by any
cause w h i c h the Architect determines may justify the
delay, then the Contract Time shall be extended by
Change Order for such reasonable time as the Architect
may determine.
8.3.2 All claims for extension of time shall be made in
writing to the Architect no more than twenty days after
the occurrence of the delay; otherwise they shall be
waived. In the case of a continuing cause of delay only
one claim is necessary
8.3.3 If no schedule or agreement is made stating the
dates upon which written interpretations as set forth in
Subparagraph 1 2 5 shall be furnished, then no claim for
delay shall be allowed on account of failure to furnish
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such interpretations until •iftrcn OJVS after demand is
made for them, and not trwi unless such claim is
reasonable
8.3,4 This Paragraph 8 3 do*s not exclude the recovery
of damages for delay by either party under other provisions of the Contract Documents
ARTICLE 9
PAYMENTS A N D
9.1

COMPLETION

CONTRACT SUM

9.1.1 The Contract Sum is stated in the Agreement and
is the total amount payable by the Owner to the Contractor for the performance of the Work under the
Contract Documents
9.2

SCHEDULE OF VALUES

9.2.1 Betore the first Application for Payment, the Contractor shall submit to the Architect a schedule of values
of the various portions of the Work, including quantities
if required by the Architect, aggregating the total Contract Sum, divided so as to facilitate payments to Subcontractors in accordance with Paragraph 5 4, prepared in
such form as specified or as the Architect and the Contractor may agree upon, and supported by such data to
substantiate its correctness as the Architect may require.
Each item in the schedule of values shall include its
proper share of overhead and profit This schedule, when
approved by the Architect, shall be used only as a basis
for the Contractor's Applications for Payment
9.3

PROGRESS PAYMENTS

9.3.1 At least ten days before each progress payment
falls due, the Contractor shall submit to the Architect an
itemized Application for Payment, supported by such
data substantiating the Contractor's right to payment as
the Owner or the Architect may require

9.4

CERTIFICATES FOR PAYMENT

9.4.1 If the Contractor has made Application for Payment as above, the Architect will, with reasonable
promptness but not more than seven days after the receipt of the Application, issue a Certificate for Payment
to the Owner, with a copy to the Contractor, for such
amount as he determines to be properly due, or state in
writing his reasons for withholding a Certificate as provided in Subparagraph 9 5 1
9.4.2 The issuance of a Certificate for Payment will constitute a representation by the Architect to the Owner,
based on his observations at the site as provided in Subparagraph 2 2 4 and the data comprising the Application for Payment, that the Work has progressed to the
point indicated, that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief the quality of the Work is m ac
cordance with the Contract Documents (subject to an
evaluation of the Work for conformance with the Contract Documents upon Substantial Completion, to the
results of any subsequent tests required by the Contract
Documents, to minor deviations from the Contract Documents correctable prior to completion, and to any specific qualifications stated in his Certificate), and that the
Contractor is entitled to payment in the amount certified
In addition, the Architect's final Certificate for Payment
will constitute a further representation that the conditions precedent to the Contractor's being entitled to final
payment as set forth in Subparagraph 9 7 2 have been
fulfilled However, by issuing a Certificate for Payment,
the Architect shall not thereby be deemed to represent
that he has made exhaustive or continuous on-site
inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work
or that he has reviewed the construction means, methods,
techniques, sequences or procedures, or that he has
made any examination to ascertain how or for what
purpose the Contractor has used the moneys previously
paid on account of the Contract Sum

9.3.2 If payments are to be made on account of materials or equipment not incorporated in the Work but de
livered and suitably stored at the site, or at some other
location agreed upon in writing, such payments shall be
conditioned upon submission by the Contractor of bills
of sale or such other procedures satisfactory to the
Owner to establish the Owner's title^to such materials or
equipment or otherwise protect the Owner's interest including applicable insurance and transportation to the
site

9.5

9'.3.3 The Contractor warrants and guarantees that title
to all Work, materials and equipment covered by an
Application for Payment, whether incorporated in the
Project or not, will pass to the Owner upon the receipt
of such payment by the Contractor, free and clear of
ail hens, claims, security interests or encumbrances, hereinafter referred to in this Article 9 as "liens", and that no
Work, materials or equipment covered by an Application
for Payment will have been acquired by the Contractor,
or by any other person performing the Work at the site
or furnishing materials and equipment for the Project,
subject to an agreement under which an interest therein
or an encumbrance thereon is retained by the seller or
otherwise imposed by the Contractor or such other
person

9.5.1 The Architect may decline to approve an Application for Payment and may withhold his Certificate in
whole or in part, to the extent necessary reasonably to
protect the Owner, if in his opinion he is unable to make
representations to the Owner as provided in Subparagraph 9 4 2 The Architect may also decline to approve
any Applications for Payment or, because of subsequently
discovered evidence or subsequent inspections, he may
nullify the whole or any part of any Certificate for Payment previously issued, to such extent as may be necessary in his opinion to protect the Owner from loss because of
.1 defective work not remedied,
.2 third party claims tiled or reasonable evidence
indicating probable filing of such claims,

9.4.3 After the Architect has issued a Certificate for Payment, the Owner shall make payment in the manner provided in the Agreement
9.4.4 No certificate for a progress payment, nor any
progress payment, nor any partial or entire use or occupancy of the Project by the Owner, shall constitute an
acceptance of any Work not in accordance with the Contract Documents
PAYMENTS WITHHELD
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.3 failure of the Contractor to make payments properly to Subcontractors or for labor, materials or
equipment,
,4 reasonable doubt that the Work can be completed for the unpaid balance of the Contract
Sum,
3 damage to another contractor,
•6 reasonable indication that the Work will not be
completed within the Contract Time, or
.7 unsatisfactory prosecution of the Work by the
Contractor
9.5.2 When the above grounds in Subparagraph 9 5 1
are removed, payment shall be made for amounts withheld because of them.
9.6
FAILURE OF PAYMENT
9.6.1 If the Architect should fail to issue any Certificate
for Payment, through no fault of the Contractor, within
seven days after receipt of the Contractor's Application
for Payment, or if the Owner should fail to pay the Contractor within seven days after the date of payment established in the Agreement any amount certified bv the
Architect or awarded by arbitration, then the Contractor may, upon seven additional days' written notice to
the Owner and the Architect, stop the Work until payment of the amount owing has been received.
9.7

SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION ANO FINAL PAYMENT

9.7.1 When the Contractor determines that the Work
or a designated portion thereof acceptable to the Owner
is substantially complete, the Contractor shall prepare tor
submission to the Architect a list of items to be completed or corrected. The failure to include any items
on such list does not alter the responsibility of the Contractor to complete all Work in accordance with the
Contract Documents When the Architect on the basis or
an inspection determines that the Work is substantially
complete, he will then prepare a Certificate of Substantial
Completion which shall establish the Date of Substantial
Completion, shall state the responsibilities of the Owner
and the Contractor for maintenance, heat, utilities, and
insurance, and shall fix the time within which the Contractor shall complete the items listed therein The Certificate of Substantial Completion shall be submitted to
the Owner and the Contractor for their written accept
ance of the responsibilities assigned to them in such
Certificate
9.7.2 Upon receipt of written notice that the Work is
ready for final inspection and acceptance and upon receipt of a final Application for Payment, the Architect
will promptly make such inspection and, when he finds
the Work acceptable under the Contract Documents and
the Contract fully performed, he will promptly issue a
final Certificate for Payment stating that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, and on the basis of
his observations and inspections, the Work has been
completed in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the Contract Documents and that the entire balance
found to be due the Contractor, and noted in said final
Certificate,^ due and payable
9.7.3 Neither the final payment nor the remaining retained percentage shall become due until the Contractor
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submits to the Architect (1) an Affidavit that all payrolls,
bills for materials and equipment, and other indebtedness
connected with the Work for which the Owner or his
property might in any way be responsible, have been
paid or otherwise satisfied, (2) consent of surety, if any,
to final payment and (3), if required by the Owner, other
data establishing payment or satisfaction of ail such obligations, such as receipts, releases and waivers of liens
arising out of the Contract, to the extent and in such form
as may be designated by the Owner If any Subcontractor refuses to furnish a release or waiver required by the
Owner, the Contractor may furnish a bond satisfactory to
the Owner to indemnify him against any such hen If
any such hen remains unsatisfied after all payments are
made, the Contractor shall refund to the Owner all
moneys that the latter may be compelled to pay in discharging such hen, including all costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
9.7.4 If after Substantial Completion of the Work final
completion thereof is materially delayed through no fault
of the Contractor, and the Architect so confirms, the
Owner shall, upon certification by the Architect, and without terminating the Contract, make payment of the balance due for that portion of the Work fully completed
and accepted If the remaining balance for Work not fully
completed or corrected is less than the retamage stipulated in the Agreement, and if bonds have been furnished
as required in Subparagraph 7.5 1, the written consent of
the surety to the payment of the balance due for that
portion of the Work fully completed and accepted shall
be submitted by the Contractor to the Architect prior to
certification of such payment Such payment shall be
made under the terms and conditions governing final
payment, except that it shall not constitute a waiver of
claims
9.7.5 The making of final payment shall constitute a
waiver of all claims by the Owner except those arising
from
.1 unsettled hens,
.2 faulty or defective Work appearing after Substantial Completion,
.3 failure of the Work to comply with the requirements of the Contract Documents, or
.4 terms of any special guarantees required by the
Contract Documents
9.7.6 The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a
waiver of all claims by the Contractor except those previously made in writing and still unsettled
ARTICLE 10
PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
10.1 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND PROGRAMS
10,1.1 The Contractor shall be responsible for initiating,
maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and
programs in connection with the Work
10.2 SAFETY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
10.2.1 The Contractor shall take all reasonable precautions for the safety of, and shall provide all reasonable
protection to prevent damage, injury or loss to
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.1 all employees on the Work and alt other persons who may be affected thereby,
.2 all the Work and all materials and equipment
to be incorporated therein, whether in storage
on or off the site, under the care, custody or
control of the Contractor or any of his Subcontractors or Sub-subcontractors, and
.3 other property at the site or adjacent thereto,
including trees, shrubs, lawns, walks, pavements,
roadways, structures and utilities not designated
for removal, relocation or replacement in the
course of construction
10.2.2 The Contractor shall comply with ail applicable
laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and lawful orders of
any public authority having jurisdiction for the safety
of persons or property or to protect them from damage,
injury or loss He shall erect and maintain, as required
by existing conditions and progress of the Work, all
reasonable safeguards for safety and protection, including posting danger signs and other warnings against hazards, promulgating safety regulations and notifying owners
and users of adjacent utilities
10.2.3 When the use or storage of explosives or other
hazardous materials or equipment is necessary for the
execution of the Work, the Contractor shall exercise
the utmost care and shall carry on such activities under
the supervision of properly qualified personnel
10.2.4 All damage or loss to any property referred to in
Clauses 1021 2 and 1021 3 caused in whole or in part
by the Contractor, any Subcontractor, any Sub-subcontractor, or anyone directly or indirectly employed by any
of them, or by anyone for whose acts any of them may
be liable shall be remedied by the Contractor, except
damage or loss attributable to faulty Drawings or Specifications or to the acts or omissions of the Owner or Architect or anyone employed by either of them or for whose
acts either of them may be liable, and not attributable to
the fault or negligence of the Contractor
10.2.5 The Contractor shall designate a responsible
member of his organization at the site whose duty shall
be the prevention of accidents This person shall be the
Contractors superintendent unless otherwise designated
in writing by the Contractor to the Owner and the
Architect
10.2.6 The Contractor shall not load or permit any part
of the Work to be loaded so as to endanger its safety
10.3

EMERGENCIES

10.3.1 In any emergency affecting the safety of persons
or property, the Contractor shall act, at his discretion,
to prevent threatened damage, injury or loss. Any addi
tional compensation or extension of time claimed by the
Contractor on account of emergency work shall be determined as provided in Article 12 for Changes in the
Work
ARTICLE 11
INSURANCE
11.1

CONTRACTOR'S UA8IUTY INSURANCE

11.1.1 The Contractor shall purchase and maintain such

insurance as will protect him from claims set forth below
which may arise out of or result from the Contractor's
operations under the Contract, whether such operations
be by himself or by any Subcontractor or by anyone directly or indirectly employed by any of them, or by anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable
.1 claims under workmen s compensation, disability
benefit and other similar employee benefit acts,
.2 claims for damages because of bodily injury,
occupational sickness or disease, or death of his
employees,
3 claims for damages because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, or death of any person other
than his employees,
.4 claims for damages insured by usual personal
injury liability coverage which are sustained (1)
by any person as a result of an offense directly or
indirectly related to the employment of such
person by the Contractor, or (2) by any other
person, and
.5 claims for damages because of injury to or destruction of tangible propertv, including loss of
use resulting therefrom
11.1.2 The insurance required by Subparagraph 1 1 1 1
shall be written for not less than any limits of liability
specified in the Contract Oocuments, or required by law,
whichever is greater, and shall include contractual liability
insurance as applicable to the Contractor's obligations
under Paragraph 418
11.1.3 Certificates of Insurance acceptable to the Owner
shall be filed with the Owner prior to commencement of
the Work These Certificates shall contain a provision that
coverages afforded under the policies will not be cancelled until at least fifteen days' prior written notice has
been given to the Owner
11.2

OWNER'S LIABILITY INSURANCE

11.2.1 The Owner shall be responsible for purchasing
and maintaining his own liability insurance and at his
option,may purchase and maintain such insurance as will
protect him against claims which may arise from opera
tions under the Contract
1 1 J PROPERTY INSURANCE
113.1 Unless otherwise provided the Owner shall pur
chase and maintain property insurance upon the entire
Work at the site to the full insurable value thereof This
insurance shall include the interests of the Owner, the
Contractor, Subcontractors and Sub-subcontractors in the
Work and shall insure against the penis of Fire, Extended
Coverage, Vandalism and Malicious Mischief
11.3.2 The Owner shall purchase and maintain sucn
steam boiler and machinery insurance as may be required
by the Contract Documents or by law This insurance
shall include the interests of the Owner, the Contractor
Subcontractors and Sub-subcontractors in the Work
113.3 Any insured loss is to be adjusted with the Owne r
and made payable to the Owner as trustee for the in
sureds, as their interests may appear, subject to the re
quirements of any applicable mortgagee clause and o
Subparagraph 113 8
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11.3.4 The O w n e r shall file a copy of all policies w i t h
the Contractor before an exposure to loss may occur. If
the O w n e r does not intend to purchase such insurance
he shall inform the Contractor in writing prior to c o m mencement of the W o r k . The Contractor may then effect
insurance w h i c h w i l l protect the interests of himself, his
Subcontractors and the Sub-subcontractors in the W o r k ,
and by appropriate Change Order the cost thereof shall
be charged to the O w n e r If the Contractor is damaged by
failure of the O w n e r to purchase or maintain such insurance and so to notify the Contractor, then the O w n e r
shall bear all reasonable costs properly attributable
thereto.
11.3.5 11 the Contractor requests in writing that insurance for special hazards be included in the property insurance policy, the Owner shall, if possible, include such
insurance, and the cost thereof shall be charged to the
Contractor by appropriate Change Order
11.3.6 The O w n e r and Contractor waive all rights against
each other for damages caused by fire or other perils to
the extent covered by insurance provided under this Paragraph 1 1 3 , except such rights as they may have to the
proceeds of such insurance held by the Owner as trustee.
The Contractor shall require similar waivers by Subcon
tractors and Sub-subcontractors in accordance w i t h
Clause 5.3.1.5.
1 1 . 3 . 7 If required in writing by any party in interest, the
O w n e r as trustee shall, upon the occurrence of an insured
loss, give bond for the proper performance of his duties.
He shall deposit in a separate account any money so received, and he shall distribute it in accordance with such
agreement as the parties in interest may reach, or in accordance w i t h an award by arbitration in which case the
procedure shall be as provided in Paragraph 7 10 It after
such loss no other special agreement is made, replacement of damaged w o r k shall be covered by an appropriate Change Order
11.3.8 The O w n e r as trustee shall have power to adjust
and settle any loss w i t h the insurers unless one of the
parties in interest shall object in writing within five days
after the occurrence of loss to the Owner's exercise of
this power, and if such objection be made, arbitrators
shall be chosen as provided in Paragraph 7 10 The O w n e r
as trustee shall, in that case, make settlement with the
insurers in accordance with the directions of such arbitrators. If distribution of the insurance proceeds by
arbitration is required, the arbitrators will direct such
distribution.
1 -1.4

LOSS OF USE INSURANCE

11.4.1 The Owner, at his option, may purchase and
maintain such insurance as w i l l insure him against loss of
use of his property due to fire or other hazards, however
caused
ARTICLE 12
C H A N G E S I N THE W O R K
12.1
CHANGE ORDERS
12.1.1 The O w n e r without invalidating the Contract,
may order Changes in the Work within the general scope
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of the Contract consisting of additions, deletions or other
revisions, the Contract Sum and the Contract Time being
adjusted accordingly. All such Changes in the Work shall
be authorized by Change Order, and shall be executed
under the applicable conditions of the Contract Documents.
12.1.2 A Change Order is a written order to the Contractor signed by the Owner and the Architect, issued
after the execution of the Contract, authorizing a Change
in the Work or an adjustment in the Contract Sum or the
Contract Time. Alternatively, the Change Order may be
signed by the Architect alone, provided he has written
authority from the Owner for such procedure and that a
copy of such written authority is furnished to the Contractor upon request. A Change Order may also be signed
by the Contractor if he agrees to the adjustment in the
Contract Sum or the Contract Time The Contract Sum
and the Contract Time may be changed only by Change
Order
12.1.3 The cost or credit to the Owner resulting from a
Change in the Work shall be determined in one or more
of the following ways*
.1 bv mutual acceptance of a lump sum properly
itemized,
.2 by unit prices stated in the Contract Documents
or subsequently agreed u p o n ; or
•3 by cost and a mutually acceptable fixed or percentage fee.
12.1.4 If none of the methods set forth in Subparagraph
12.1.3 is agreed u p o n , the Contractor, provided he receives a Change Order, shall promptly proceed with the
Work involved The cost of such Work shall then be determined by the Architect on the basis of the Contractor's
reasonable expenditures and savings, including, in the
case of an increase in the Contract Sum, a reasonable
allowance for overhead and profit. In such case, and also
under Clause 12.1 3.3 above, the Contractor shall keep
and present, in such form as the Architect may prescribe,
an itemized accounting together with appropriate supporting data. Pending final determination of cost to the
Owner, pavments on account shall be made on the
Architect's Certificate for Pavment. The amount of credit
to be allowed by the Contractor to the Owner for any
deletion or change which results in a net decrease in cost
w i l l be the amount of the actual net decrease as confirmed by the Architect When both additions and credits
are involved in any one change, the allowance for overhead and profit shall be figured on the basis of net increase, if any
12.1.5 If unit prices are stated in the Contract Documents or subsequently agreed upon, and if the quantities
originally contemplated are so changed in a proposed
Change Order that application of the agreed unit prices
to the quantities of Work proposed will create a hardship on the Owner or the Contractor, the applicable unit
prices shall be equitably adjusted to prevent such hardship
12.1.6 Should concealed conditions encountered in the
performance of the Work below the surface of the ground
be at variance w i t h the conditions indicated by the Contract Documents or should unknown physical conditions
belov\ the surtace ot the ground of an unusual nature
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differing materially from i h m r ordinarily encountered and
generally recogni/cd JS ^ ^ » m ( in \sntK of thi» < harjcter
provided for in (his ( ' U P C M I ! frw c n i o u n j c i ' d . tho (!ontract Sum shall be c q u i u h U .uijustcd In Lii.invic Order
upon claim by either p j / t \ m j d c within twrntv days
after the first observance of the conditions
12.1.7 If the Contractor claims that additional cost is
involved because of (1) any written interpretation issued
pursuant to SubparaKraph 1.2.5. (2) any order by the
Owner to stop the Work pursuant to Paragraph 3.3 where
the Contractor was not at fault, or (3) any written order
for a minor change in the Work issued pursuant to Paragraph 12.3, the Contractor shall make such claim as provided in Paragraph 12.2.
12.2

CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL COST

12.2.1 If the Contractor wishes to make a claim for an
increase in the Contract Sum, he shall give the Architect
written notice thereof within twenty days after the occurrence of the event giving rise to such claim. This notice
shall be given by the Contractor before proceeding to execute the Work, except in an emergency endangering life
or property in which case the Contractor shall proceed in
accordance with Subparagraph 10.3.1. No such claim shall
be valid unless so made. If the Owner and the Contractor
cannot agree on the amount of the adjustment in the
Contract Sum, it shall be determined by the Architect.
Any change in the Contract Sum resulting from such
claim shall be authorized by Change Order.
12.3

MINOR CHANGES IN THE WORK

12.3.1 The Architect shall have authority to order minor
changes in the Work not involving an adjustment in the
Contract Sum or an extension of the Contract Time and
not inconsistent with the intent of the Contract D o c u ments. Such changes may be effected by Field Order or
by other written order. Such changes shall be binding on
the Owner and the Contractor.
12.4

FIELD ORDERS

12.4.1 The Architect may issue written Field Orders
which interpret the Contract Documents in accordance
w i t h Subparagraph 1.2.5 or which order minor changes
in the Work in accordance with Paragraph 12.3 w i t h o u t
change in Contract Sum or Contract Time. The Contractor
shall carry out such Field Orders promptly.
ARTICLE 13
U N C O V E R I N G A N D C O R R E C T I O N OF W O R K
13.1

UNCOVERING OF WORK

13.1.1 If any Work should be covered contrary to the request of the Architect, it must, if required by the Architect, be uncovered for his observation and replaced, at
the Contractor's expense.
13.1.2 If any other Work has been covered which the
Architect has not specifically requested to observe prior
to being covered, the Architect may request to see such
W o r k and it shall be uncovered by the Contractor. If
such Work be found in accordance w i t h the Contract
Documents, the cost of uncovering and replacement

shall, by appropriate Change Order, be charged to the
Owner. If such Work be round not in accordance with
(he Contract Documents, the Contractor shall pay such
costs unless it be found that this condition was caused
by a separate contractor employed as provided in Article
6. and in that event the Owner shall be responsible for
the payment of such costs.
13.2

CORRECTION OF WORK

13.2.1 The Contractor shall promptly correct all Work
rejected by the Architect as defective or as failing to conform to the Contract Documents whether observed
before or after Substantial Completion and whether or
not fabricated, installed or completed. The Contractor
shall bear all cost of correcting such rejected Work, including the cost of the Architect's additional services
thereby made necessary.
13.2.2 If, within one year after the Date of Substantial
Completion or within such longer period of time as may
be prescribed by law or bv the terms of any applicable
special guarantee required bv the Contract Documents,
any oi the Work is found to be defective or not in accordance with the Contract Documents, the Contractor
shall correct it promptly after receipt of a written notice
from the Owner to do so unless the Owner has previously given the Contractor a written acceptance of such
condition. The Owner shall give such notice promptly
after discovery of the condition.
13.2.3 All such defective or non-conforming Work under
Subparagraphs 13.2.1 and 13.2.2 shall be removed from
the site if necessary, and the Work shall be corrected to
comply with the Contract Documents without cost to
the Owner.
13.2.4 The Contractor shall bear the cost of making
good all work of separate contractors destroyed or damaged by such removal or correction.
13.2.5 If the Contractor dees not remove such defective
or non-conforming Work within a reasonable time fixed
by written notice from the Architect, the Owner may
remove it and may store the materials or equipment at
the expense of the Contractor. If the Contractor does not
pav the cost of such removal and storage within ten days
thereafter, the Owner may upon ten additional days'
written notice sell such Work at auction or at private sale
and shall account for the net proceeds thereof, after
deducting ail the costs that should have been borne by
the Contractor including compensation for additional
architectural services. If such proceeds of sale do not
cover all costs which the Contractor should have borne,
the difference shall be charged to the Contractor and an
appropriate Change Order shall be issued. If the payments then or thereafter due the Contractor are not sufficient to cover such amount, the Contractor shall pay the
difference to the Owner.
13.2.6 If the Contractor fails to correct such defective
or non-conforming Work, the Owner may correct it in
accordance with Paragraph 3.4.
13.3

ACCEPTANCE OF DEFECTIVE
OR NON-CONFORMING WORK

13.3.1 If the Owner prefers to accept defective or nonconforming Work, he may do so instead of requiring its
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removal and correction, in w h i c h case a Change Order
will be issued to reflect an appropriate reduction in the
Contract Sum, or, if the amount is determined after final
payment, it shall be paid by the Contractor

ARTICLE 14

T E R M I N A T J O N O F THE
14.1

CONTRACT

TERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTOR

14.1.1 If the W o r k is stopped for a period of thirty
days under an order oi any court or other public authority
having jurisdiction, or as a result of an act of government,
such as a declaration of a national emergency making
materials unavailable, through no act or fault of the Contractor or a Subcontractor or their agents or emplovees
or any other persons performing any of the W o r k under
a contract w i t h the Contractor, or if the W o r k should be
stopped for a period of thirty days by the Contractor for
the Architect's failure to issue a Certificate for Payment as
provided in Paragraph 9 6 or for the Owner's failure to
make payment thereon as provided in Paragraph 9 6,
then the Contractor may, upon seven days' written notice
to the O w n e r and the Architect, terminate the Contract
and recover from the O w n e r payment for all Work executed and for any proven loss sustained upon any materials, equipment, tools, construction equipment and
machinery, including reasonable profit and damages
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14.2

TERMINATION BY THE OWNER

14.2.1 If the Contractor is adjudged a bankrupt, or if he
makes a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors, or if a receiver is appointed on account of his i n solvency, or if he persistently or repeatedly refuses or
fails, except in cases for which extension of time is p r o vided, to supply enough properly skilled workmen or
proper materials, or if he fails to make prompt payment
to Subcontractors or for materials or labor, or persistently
disregards laws, ordinances, rules, regulations or orders
of any public authority having jurisdiction, or otherwise
is guilty of a substantial violation of a provision of the
Contract Documents, then the Owner, upon certification
by the Architect that sumcient cause exists to justify such
action, may, w i t h o u t prejudice to any right or remedy
and after giving the Contractor and his surety, if any,
seven days written notice, terminate the employment of
the Contractor and take possession of the site and of
ail materials, equipment, tools construction equipment
and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may
finish the Work by whatever method he may deem expedient In such case the Contractor shall not be entitled
to receive any further payment until the Work is finished
14.2.2 If the unpaid balance of the Contract Sum exceeds the cosis of finishing the Work, including c o m pensation for the Architect s additional services, such
excess shall be paid to the Contractor If such costs ex
ceed such unpaid balance, the Contractor shall pay the
difference to the Owner. The costs incurred by the O w n e r
as herein provided shall be certified by the Architect
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ADDENDUM VI
SWIMMING POOL SPECS, LITTLE AMERICA,
JOB NO. 22102
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SWIMMING POOL
Section 13850

jflFT 1 - GENERAL
1#1

Conditions: Division 0 and Division 1 apply to the work
of this Section.

1,2

Principal Work In This Section
a. Coordinate all work in this Section with related trades.
b. Verify all dimensions at the jobsite.
c. Swimming pool complete with all equipment and systems.
in operating condition.
d. Engineering design of gunite inner shell and reinforcing.
e. Engineering and installation of mechanical, plumbing,
and electrical systems from points of connection and
supply in the swimming pool equipment room.
f«

Piping, conduit and wiring.

g. Maintenance equipment.
h. Vibration and sound isolation.
i. Permits, inspections, tests and fees.
1#

^

Belated Work In Other Sections
a. Poured-in-place structural concrete beneath pneumatically-placed concrete swimming pool shell.
b. Membrane waterproofing beneath pneumatically-placed
concrete swimming pool shell.
c

-

Final connections to plumbing supply and waste lines.

d. Pinal connections to electrical power supply.
e

Ceramic tile, plastering and painting, other than
that required for swimming pool.

^

Whirlpool and equipment.

«

S. Heat exchanger.

lASn

LITTLE AMERICA, SALT LAKE
JOB NO. 22102
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SWIMMING POOL
Section 13850

j^

Drawings and Permits
*
Design construct and install the swimming pool and
S d "nifl™Pluming Code in tne basic configuration .
and with the features shown on the drawings.
b. Secure and pay fees for required permits, inspections
and tests of the governing agencies.

1.5

Shop Drawings
a. Submit shop drawings bearing the approval stamp of
all governing agencies to the Architect for review.
b

1.6

Show eauipment room layouts, piping and conduit sizes
and routings and electrical wiring diagrams.

Tests and Inspections
a. Test supply lines under at least 35 psi pressure; waste
lines may be tested at 10 psi.
b. Test the swimming pool equipment under full ° P « ^ i o n a l
conditions. Correct excessive noise and vibration
from the equipment.

= • M E m^nance SWSSJETSS ^ ^ S ^
d. Furnish duplicate copies of operation and maintenance
brochures to the Architect.
1-7

Definition
a. 1

^

(Pneumatically placed

^

^

\

^

^

^

e

If norland cement and sand that has been thoroughly
m L e T f r y f pasTed thru a cement gun and conveyecb,^axr
thru a flexible tube, grated at a nozzle a^^ne
of the flexible tube and deposited by air pressure 1
its place of final repose.
E&g£_2 - PRODUCTS
2

*1

Gunite and Finish Materials
a. Portland cement: ASTM C150, Type 1; white for plaster.
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Section 13850

b.

Fine aggregate: ASTM C33*

c. Water:
d.

Clean and potable.

Reinforcing: ASTM A6l5, grade 40.

e. Welded wire fabric: ASTM Al85; fabricated of not
lighter than 14 gage wires formed into a 2" x 2"
mesh.
f.

Plaster sand:

Landon Opalyte.

g.

Ceramic tile: In accordance with Section 09310*
6" x 6" glazed tile in any of the special colors from
"Interpace. "

h.

Depth markers: Ceramic tile, as above, fired with
white letter and numbers. Size of tile 6" x 6"; size
of letters and numbers per code.

i.

Expansion joint: Sealant in accordance with Section
07900 and tan colored plastic top by "Paddock."

j.

Coping: 12" wide, cast stone with travertine finish
in special color selected by Architect.

Plumbing; Materials
a.

Conform to Plumbing Section of Division 15 and as
follows:

b.

Piping:

c.

Fittings: Copper or brass.

d.

Valves: Brass.

Type L copper.

Electrical Materials
a.

Conform to Division 16, "Electrical" and as follows:

t>. Conduit imbedded in concrete: Brass.
c#

Fittings for 2.3b above: Brass.

3
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Equipment and Accessories
a.

Products specified hereafter are manufactured by
Swimquip to establish a standard of quality. Comparable products by Swimrite or Purex are acceptable.

b.

Mechanical Equipment:
QTY.

CAT. NO.

DESCRIPTION

1.

29323-106

H-3/F 106 pressure diatomaceous earth
filter w/3 face piping as cataloged.

1

29607

12" x 18" open top precoat tank

1

21404-2

Model #1398 slurry/chlorine feed
package, consisting of two 53 gallon
solution tanks, dual head feeder
pump(110V, 1 phase) and slurry
agitator.

1

16903-448

5 HP flooded suction pump, model
#2050-1. 2" x 2-1/2", cast iron,
bronze fitted w/packing gland. 3
phase, 60 cycle, 3500 RPM 230/460
volt. Capacity: 160 GPM @ 75 ft
TDH.

1

13801-325

3" IPS pump strainer

1

14550-13

3" model #F-300 flow meter.

4

8650

U-3 surface extended throat skimmer
w/2" connections.

4

8655-4

2" check valve for above.

4

8429-1

2" skimmer equalizer fitting for
above.

6

8428

1-1/4" cycolac eyeball inlet fitting.

2

8062

1-1/2" CPB vacuum wall outlet.

2
1

7120
8741

12 x 12 CPB frame & grate
1-1/2" stainless steel fillspout.
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Deck Equipment:
QTY,

CAT NO,

1

2624-34

1

1501-12

2

3352

2

3394

4

4031

4

4512

2

9142

DESCRIPTION
Coronado diving stand w/stainless
steel handrails.
12 foot aluminum diving board.
3 tread ladder with anchors.
48" S.S. handrail for shallow end steps.
Wedge anchor for above.
S.S.

escutcheon plate for above*

Chrome plated brass cup anchor.

2

9163

25'

9340

3/4" safety line hooks.
3/4" safety line rope*

4

9220-2
5" x 9" safety line floats,

Main.tenance Equi
ant:

1

10402

1

12100-1

1

11069-41

1

10800

1

12062

1

12512

1

12640

2

12062

1

22111

vacuum cleaner head.
1-1/2" x 24 ft. handle.
1-1/2" x 40 foot vacuum hose.
1-1/2" hose to wall connector.
1-1/4" x 16 foot handle.
18" wall brush.
Leaf skimmer.
1-1/4" x 16 foot handle.
Taylor test kit.
Electrical Equipment:
8

5072-51

500W underwater light with 50 ft. cord.

4

5068-12

S.S. light niche.

4

5070-123

3 A " junction box.

SWIMMING POOL
Section 13850

PAET 3 - EXECUTION
3.I

General
a.

In general, perform the various parts of the work of
this Section in conformance with the requirements of
these Specifications as follows:
(1) Reinforcing, Section 03200

3«2

(2)

Ceramic Tile, Section 09310

(3)

Plumbing, Division 15

(4)

Electrical, Division 16

b.

Provide the filtering system with the necessary piping,
valves and fittings complete from inlet to outlet.
Arrange the piping to carry out filtering, recirculating and drainage operations and to provide adequate
and efficient operation of the vacuum cleaner.

c.

Construct pipe lines of full length sections, straight
and true. Do not spring or force piping into place.
Do not bend piping.

d.

Seat flange fittings with ring or full face neoprene
gaskets.

e.

Cap or plug pipe ends and holes to exclude dirt.

f.

Furnish fittings, inserts, sleeves and equipment housing
together with approved setting drawings to the concrete
contractor in ample time for setting in the form work.

Gunite
a.

Proportions: Not less than 1 part cement to 4-1/2
parts dry loose sand by volume, mixed dry in a mixing
machine for not less than one minute after materials
have been added. Introduce hydration at the cement
gun nozzle, controlling water content so that no slump
or dry pockets occur in placed material..

b.

Provide 50 lbs. minimum air pressure at the cement
gun when the material hose is 100 feet or less in
length. Maintain: at least 15 lbs. greater water pressure
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than air pressure at the nozzle. Do not use a nozzle
whose tip pressure size is greater than 1-3A" diameter.
c.

Gunite the coves and up the walls shooting gunite at
right angles to surfaces. Build up in layers of a
thickness to prevent slumping, allowing time between
layers for an initial set to occur. Cover the reinforcing with the first layer. Remove loose aggregate
and rebound before placing succeeding layers. Do not
re-use materials.

d.

Rod the surface to true lines upon reaching the thickness and planes outlined by forms and ground wires.
Remove ground wires and finish with a wood float.

e. Do not place gunite during rain. Keep newly placed
material moist for 5 days after placing.
3.3

Finish and Trim
a.

Install the ceramic tile splash band and depth markers
in the swimming pool. Furnish the deck markers to
the decking installer.

b.

Scrub the rough interior gunite clean prior to application of the finish plaster. During this operation,
cap the main suction line and pump the dirty water out
of the pool.

c«

With the rough interior surface wet, apply a scratch
coat, using a mixture of one part portland cement to
1-1/4 parts Landon Opalyte. Batch mix scratch coat
materials and apply 1/8 thick, floating to a uniform
plane. After initial set has occurred, lightly broom
the scratch coat after which apply a finish coat of the
same material and approximate thickness and trowel to a
smooth, dense impervious surface. Apply this coat
continuously to avoid lag-marks; avoid overtroweling
in order to prevent trowel stains.

-END-
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WHIRLPOOL BATH AND SAUNA EQUIPMENT
Section 15450

PART 1 - GENERAL
1.1

Conditions: Division 0, Division 1 and Sections 15010,
15050, 15120 and 15160 apply to the work of this Section.

1.2

Principal Work In This Section

1*3

1.4

a.

Coordinate all work in this Section with related trades.

b.

Verify all dimensions at the jobsite.

c.

Whirlpool bath.

d.

Sauna equipment.

Related Work In Other Sections
a.

Electrical connections.

b.

Sauna enclosures.

Submittals:
a.

Submit manufacturer's catalogs and literature for the
Architect's review before performing any work.

b.

Provide the appropriate trades with rough-in drawings
of mechanical and electrical connections.

PART 2 - PRODUCTS

2.1

Whirlpool Bath; 10f diameter "Roman Spa Whirlpool" package,, as
manufactured by American Leisure Holding Corp., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, provided with the following items:
a.

Bronze pumps.

b.

208 voltage.

c.

Two additional jets (total of 8 jets) and larger jet
pump.

d.

1-1/2 hp Hydro air blower.

e. Timers.

1

LITTLE AMERICA, SALT LAKE
JOB NO. 22102

WHIRLPOOL BATH AND SAUNA EQUIPMENT
Section 15450

(1) 1-60 minute.
(2) 24 hour timer for filters and heater.

2.2

f.

Chlorinator and chemical kit.

g.

Chrome pipe handrail at steps.

h.

Color shall match American Standard's "Fawn Beige".

i.

Electric heater, filter and filter pump.

j.

Chemical maintenance kit.

Sauna Equipment: As supplied by Custom Home Spas.
the following equipment for each sauna:
a.

1 each

10 k.w. Sauna Heater Model M100B

b.

1 each

8" x 10" Key Locked Tel Box.

c.

1 each

24 HR Time Clock Model 14511.

d.

1 each

Thermostat Model MSP.

e.

1 each

Wood Sauna Door Handle.

f.

1 each

Thermometer Model YMCAT.

Provide

208V.

PART ^ - EXECUTION
3.1

Ship the whirlpool bath to the jobsite with all fittings
for air and water secured in place and integral piping
installed.

3.2

Install whirlpool bath and sauna equipment in the locations
shown in strict accordance with the manufacturer's printed
instructions, so that they operate properly, as approved
by the Architect.
-END-
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